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Abstract
This thesis examines the extent to which state institutions and government
have taken into account Indigenous rights and interests during the approval
process for a large mining development. This case study focuses on the
various phases of approval for the proposed Adani Carmichael Coal Mine, a
significant development that has challenged the native title system in
Australia. It assesses the extent to which the rights and interests of the
Wangan and Jagalingou people, the traditional owners that possess a native
title claim over the region, have been upheld by the National Native Title
Tribunal and the State and Federal Government. This thesis employs multiple
theoretical perspectives to explain the outcomes of the approval process.
While this study aims to critically review the existing literature, the
application of two liberal culturalist perspectives and the broader framework
of critical race theory contribute added insights in the area of native title and
resource developments.
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Introduction
Mining Companies, the State and Indigenous Groups
This study will examine the extent to which state institutions and government
have taken into account Indigenous rights and interests during the approval
process for large mining developments. It will focus on the various phases of
approval for the Adani Carmichael Coal Mine and assess the extent to which
Indigenous rights and interests have been upheld. The Adani Carmichael
Project is a significant development proposal that has greatly challenged and
exposed limitations within Australia’s native title system (Borschmann, 2015;
Milman, 2015a, 2015b; Palese, 2015).
The Carmichael Coal Mine development is located in the Galilee Basin in
central Queensland. It will be the second largest coal mine in the world with a
proposed scale that includes six open-cut pits and a lifetime of up to 60 years
(Horn, 2016). The Wangan and Jagalingou people possess a registered native
title claim over the proposed mine site and while some community members
have sought to negotiate a land use agreement with Adani, others have
remained relentlessly opposed to the project (Milman, 2015a; Taylor, 2015;
Robertson, 2015; West, 2015).
This thesis examines the responses of state institutions and government to
Indigenous rights and interests. The terms ‘state’ and ‘government’ refer to
separate mechanisms of the modern society. The term ‘state’ refers to the set
of institutions that enforce the rules of a society, such as the administrative
bureaucracy, the judicial system and the military (Best, 2002; McAuley, 2003).
State institutions are independent of government, however, the state is tasked
with interpreting and implementing the decisions of past and present political
leadership. The term ‘government’ refers to the elected representatives of
parliament. While the government can change with every election, institutions
of the state remain constant (Best, 2002). This study will examine the
responses of state judicial bodies such as the National Native Title Tribunal
(NNTT), the elected government of the State of Queensland and the Federal
Government.
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Australia is a resource-driven nation and resource companies exercise a high
degree of power in the political sphere. The carbon lobby has influenced
government decision-making and public opinion (Baer, 2014; Esteban & Ray,
2006; Hodder, 2009; McKnight & Hobbs, 2013). It is widely known that
resource companies make significant contributions to political parties. The
heads of multinational corporations often enjoy a close relationship with
members of the public office and influence policy that relates to resource
interests (Baer, 2014; Hodder, 2009). State institutions and government have
a tendency to prioritise demands in the energy and mining sector.
International law supports the rights of Indigenous groups and encourages
nations to implement domestic laws that adhere to international standards
(Australian Law Reform Commission [ALRC], 2015). The Australian
Government faces a conflict between advancing what is considered to be the
national interest or endorsing international standards and the rights and
interests of Indigenous communities. The prevailing national interest in
resource development may compromise the interests of traditional owners
(Altman, 2009; Howlett, 2010; Marsh, 2013; Scambary, 2013).
The Wangan and Jagalingou people have a history of spiritual connection to
the lands surrounding the town of Clermont in Central Queensland (NNTT,
2014). The names ‘Wangan’ and ‘Jagalingou’ refer to different Indigenous
tribal groups that have historically inhabited the region. European settlement
on Wangan and Jagalingou land became sustained in the 1860s and several
families were forcibly removed to other areas (NNTT, 2014). However, many
of these families remained living in the traditional area and maintained a
strong physical connection to the land.
Some descendants of the Wangan and Jagalingou people have been the victims
of massacres, such as the Mistake Creek massacre of 1857 (NNTT, 2014). The
group shares a common knowledge of spiritual and religious beliefs and
continues many traditional ways of life, such as a landholding system based on
inheritance through cognatic descent. The Wangan and Jagalingou people have
demonstrated a clear connection to the traditional land that surrounds
Clermont, and the factual evidence provided to the NNTT has deemed their
native title claim as valid before the Federal Court (NNTT, 2014).
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The Wangan and Jagalingou people have had a native title claim application
registered with the NNTT since July 2004 (NNTT, 2004; Queensland South
Native Title Services [QSNTS], 2015). The application covers 30,200 square
kilometres in central Queensland. The Federal Court determined that the
group had a continuing connection to the land that pre-dated European
settlement in the region (NNTT, 2014). As there are several overlapping native
title claims involving other Indigenous groups, the final determination of the
Wangan and Jagalingou claim has been delayed. While the status of their claim
remains unresolved, the group still possesses a number of procedural rights as
registered claimants (NNTT, 2014; QSNTS, 2015). It is mandated that the
claim group are given notification of future acts and that negotiations are
conducted to reach a legally binding agreement (QSNTS, 2015).
Adani obtained the consent of the Wangan and Jagalingou people in an
Indigenous Land Use Agreement (ILUA) signed in April 2016 (“Adani mine,”
2016). However, the authorisation of this agreement was highly contentious
and problematic as a significant section of the Wangan and Jagalingou
community deemed the vote unrepresentative and illegitimate (Robertson,
2016d, 2017; Wangan and Jagalingou Family Council [WJ Family Council],
2016). The Wangan and Jagalingou people became divided in the course of
negotiations, as some community members shared different opinions about
the development on their land (Milman, 2015a; Taylor, 2015; Robertson,
2015, 2016a, 2017; West, 2015).
While one faction supported the Carmichael Project, provided the ILUA
included satisfactory terms of agreement, the other was unwilling to support
the development on any terms (Van Vonderen, 2016; Milman, 2015a;
Robertson, 2015, 2016c, West, 2015). The latter camp contended that the
project will lead to the destruction of Wangan and Jagalingou ancestral lands
and insisted that ‘no means no’ regardless of the compensation offered
(Robertson, 2016b, 2016c; WJ Family Council, 2016a). Examining the process
of division, whereby these two groups within the community developed such
opposing stances during the phases of approval, is a key focus of this thesis.
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International Law and Australia
There have been important developments over the past 20 years towards the
recognition and protection of Indigenous peoples around the globe (TauliCorpuz, 2008). Indigenous issues have been placed on the international
human rights agenda and a number of significant treaties have established the
rights of Indigenous peoples. The United Nations (UN) Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues was established in 2002 and the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) entered into force in 2007 (Palese,
2015; Tauli-Corpuz, 2008). These two Indigenous rights developments mark
significant modern advancements for Indigenous groups worldwide. The
UNDRIP has established an international framework that can inform domestic
laws dealing with the collective rights of Indigenous peoples (ALRC, 2015;
Davis, 2007). The Declaration sets the minimum standards that every country
should abide by to fully recognise and protect the rights of Indigenous groups.
While the document is not legally binding, it is recommended that countries
implement its provisions in domestic law to remain consistent with
international standards (ALRC, 2015; Davis, 2007; Tauli-Corpuz, 2008).
In 2007, 143 state parties voted in support of the UNDRIP and four voted in
opposition. The state parties that voted against the Declaration were Australia,
Canada, New Zealand and the United States (United Nations, 2007). Among
other concerns raised, these nations were opposed to language in the
Declaration suggesting Indigenous groups had the right to veto national
legislation if it was likely to impact their rights and interests. Australia’s UN
delegate contended that the references to self-determination would encourage
the secession of Australia’s Indigenous peoples and, in turn, undermine or
completely eradicate the democratic system of governance for those
populations (Davis, 2007; United Nations, 2007). In 2009, Australia reversed
its position and chose to adopt the Declaration (ALRC, 2015; Douglas, 2013;
Rodgers, 2009). Since the Declaration is non-binding, Australia’s support of its
principles places no obligation on the government to make changes to
domestic law. However, countries are encouraged to introduce or amend laws
so they fulfill the principles of the Declaration (Macklin, 2009).
While Australia has given domestic effect to a number of international treaties,
the principles of the UNDRIP have been seldom referenced in the High Court
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(ALRC, 2015). Many years before the UNDRIP entered into force, the
Australian Government passed legislation for its first national system of
collective Indigenous land rights known as native title. While the Native Title
Act (NTA) was legislated with reference to international law at the time,
universal human rights standards prior to the UNDRIP did not address
collective rights for Indigenous peoples (ALRC, 2015). The right to Free, Prior
and Informed Consent (FPIC) set out in the UNDRIP applies to Indigenous land
rights with respect to development (Hanna & Vanclay, 2013; Tauli-Corpuz,
2008; Rumler, 2011). While FPIC is cited numerous times in the Declaration, it
is Article 32 that addresses development:
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous
peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in
order to obtain their free and informed consent prior [emphasis added]
to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and
other resources, particularly in connection with the development,
utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources. (United
Nations, 2008, p. 12)
FPIC mandates the State’s responsibility to withhold development until the
consent of Indigenous communities is obtained (Hill, Lillywhite & Simon,
2010). The term ‘consent’ refers to the Indigenous group’s collective decision
to accept or reject a development. Some argue that the notion of consent
implies the right to veto development (Rumler, 2011). While the NTA ensures
the right to consultation and consent for some native title holders and
claimants, the choice to withhold consent does not veto development
(O’Faircheallaigh, 2006). If consent fails to be obtained, the Australian
Government can extinguish Indigenous rights to land through compulsory
acquisition (Australian Human Rights Commission [AHRC], 2014; NNTT,
2008a).
In many cases, native title has been overridden when the State has deemed a
development to be in the public interest. Cariño and Colchester (2010) argue
that the recognition of FPIC does not permit states to disregard consent on the
basis of national interest. However, the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA)
contends that “mineral ownership is vested in the Crown and accordingly the
process of seeking consent does not confer a right of veto to Indigenous
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people” (MCA, 2014, p. 1). Thus, the State has the overarching right to grant
tenement regardless of consent.
While it remains unclear whether FPIC implies the right to veto development,
it can be reasonably accepted that Indigenous peoples have the right to
withhold consent if a state is aligned with the principles of FPIC (Cariño &
Colchester, 2010; Collins, Ali, Lawson & Young, 2016; Portalewska, 2012;
Smyth, 2016). As Cariño and Colchester (2010) assert, “international law is
explicit that indigenous and tribal peoples enjoy the right to give or to
withhold their FPIC to activities or policies which may affect them” (p. 430).
Therefore, when consent is withheld, the State is responsible for the decision
to protect or negate the rights and interests of its Indigenous peoples.
While the Australian Government may wield the power to extinguish
Indigenous land rights in order to pave the way for development, traditional
owners can still refuse to sign an agreement and thereby withhold their
consent. The notion that consent is free of coercion means it cannot be forced
or mandated under any procedural conditions (Portalewska, 2012; Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR], 2013).
Governments must therefore make a decision to respect the interests of
traditional owners or grant mining tenement without consent. The latter
decision may cause governments to be criticised as indifferent or insensitive
to Indigenous interests and may affect the grantee’s social license to operate
(O’Faircheallaigh, 2011; Scambary, 2013).
The native title system in Australia is largely based on the assumption that
consent will be obtained, as negotiations between the government, the mining
interest and Indigenous group must be conducted in ‘good faith’ of reaching an
agreement. The scenario where a native title holder or claimant refuses to
consent to any agreement appears to be a non-option in Australian law
(Marsh, 2013).
The AHRC published a review measuring the rights afforded to Indigenous
peoples in the NTA against the principles of the UNDRIP. The review
concluded:
While the Native Title Act provides a process to recognise native title
rights and interests in the traditional lands, territories and resources
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for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, a gap exists between
the realisation of these rights and interests and those rights affirmed
in the Declaration. (AHRC, 2014, p. 9)
When compared with the principles of the UNDRIP, Indigenous land rights in
Australia fail to satisfy international standards. The protection of human
rights in Australia was assessed in the 2012 Universal Periodic Review. The
review criticised Australia for its slow domestic implementation of the
UNDRIP (AHRC, 2012). It can be concluded that native title, as the domestic
equivalent of Indigenous land rights and FPIC, does not satisfy the most recent
requirements of Indigenous rights in international law.

Australian Domestic Law
Australia’s native title system enables Indigenous groups to be granted land
rights through an application process. The recognition of Indigenous land
rights overturned the notion of terra nullius and aimed to restore a degree of
self-determination and sovereign ownership to the nation’s first peoples.
Colonialists deemed native land as terra nullius, a Latin phrase meaning
‘nobody’s land’ (Poynton, 1994; Short, 2007). The High Court’s controversial
Mabo decision in 1992 abolished the myth of terra nullius and the existence of
Indigenous customary land was nationally recognised (Finn, 2012; MoretonRobinson, 1998; Poynton, 1994; Short, 2007).
The Mabo case began with a Torres Strait Islander man who challenged the
laws governing land ownership. During the 1980s, Eddie Koliko Mabo took the
State of Queensland to court in an attempt to claim traditional ownership of
Murray Island (Hill, 1995). When the High Court ruled in favour of Mabo, the
former Prime Minister Paul Keating introduced legislation to establish a
national system for Indigenous land rights (Poynton, 1994). The Native Title
Act 1993 was the first piece of legislation that aimed to rectify the
dispossession of Indigenous land. In the years that followed its enactment,
subsequent amendments to the NTA diminished the rights attributed to native
title groups (Behrendt & Strelein, 2001; O’Faircheallaigh, 2006; Ritter, 2009).
In 1996, the High Court made a second landmark decision for Indigenous land
rights. The Wik decision ruled that pastoral leases did not necessarily
7

Kate Arnautovic, 2017
extinguish native title (Short, 2007; Strelein, 2009). The Wik people, a
collective of different Indigenous groups, took the State of Queensland to court
in order to have their native title claim recognised despite two overlapping
pastoral leases. The determination handed down in favour of the Wik people
created uncertainty for pastoralists across the nation, as pastoral leases
comprised 42 per cent of Crown land (Stevenson, 1997; Strelein, 2009). In
response, the Howard Government legislated the Native Title Amendment Act
1998. The amendments to the NTA diminished the rights of Indigenous
claimants, ruling out the coexistence of native title and pastoral leases and
increasing the requirements to prove connection (Finn, 2012; Smith &
Morphy, 2007; Strelein, 2009; Tehan, 2003).
In comparison to the NTA legislated under the Keating Government, the 1998
amendments considerably weakened Indigenous land rights (Behrendt &
Strelein, 2001; Ritter, 2009). The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social
Justice Commissioner’s 2008 annual review of the native title system found
that the NTA had failed to deliver justice for most native title groups (Marsh,
2013).
Native title claims are required to pass a number of stages to become fully
recognised. The Federal Court makes the final determination based on the
proof of connection. However, it can take a number of years for a native title
application to reach this stage (NNTT, 2009a). Before the application reaches
the Federal Court, the NNTT assesses whether the application meets the
requirements to become registered. Registered native title applicants possess
a number of procedural rights. The procedural rights given to the applicants
depend on the conditions of the proposed development. If a development is
deemed unlikely to affect the claim area, the applicants may only possess the
right to be notified or to lodge an objection (QSNTS, 2017; NTSCORP, 2017).
However, if a development is likely to infringe native title rights, the right to
negotiate (RTN) may ensue. This procedural right requires the grantee party
to conduct negotiations with the native title applicants to establish a legally
binding agreement (NNTT, 2016, 2017c; NTSCORP, 2017).
The negotiation phases examined in this thesis involve the RTN. The
Carmichael Coal Mine has been deemed a significant development that will
impact the area of the Wangan and Jagalingou claim. As this claim is registered
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with the NNTT, negotiations between Adani and the claim group are
mandated under the provisions of the NTA.

Theoretical Perspective: A Multifaceted Approach
A number of theoretical perspectives will be employed to explain the
outcomes of this thesis. The complexity of this specific case warrants multiple
modes to provide insight into the outcomes of this study.
The following theories will be summarised in this section:
•

Will Kymlicka’s liberal culturalist theory of minority rights

•

Allen Buchanan’s essay on collective land rights

•

Critical Race Theory (CRT)

Will Kymlicka: Liberal Culturalism
Will Kymlicka’s theoretical perspective in his book Multicultural Citizenship
(1995), situates multiculturalism within a liberal framework. He argues that
collective rights for minorities are justified in liberal-democratic societies to
preserve and protect cultural traditions and practices (Kymlicka, 1995).
Kymlicka’s theory of minority rights postulates that liberal principles
inherently justify collective rights for these groups (Kymlicka, 1995). There is
now a consensus among liberal theorists that collective rights for minorities
are consistent with liberal principles. Liberals who support this argument are
classified as ‘liberal culturalists’. It is the moral grounds, or justification, for
minority rights that remains contested among liberal culturalists (Kymlicka,
2001).
Kymlicka justifies collective rights on the basis of cultural membership and its
capacity to deliver the basic liberal principles of individual freedom and
autonomy. He argues that individual freedom, which is central to liberalism, is
intrinsically linked to culture (Kymlicka, 1995, 2001). To explain this
connection, Kymlicka describes the existence of societal cultures. ‘Societal
cultures’ describes a society that is territorially concentrated, has common
economic, political and educational institutions, a shared history and a
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standardised language (Kymlicka, 1995, 2001). Gaining membership to a
societal culture allows an individual to have access to “meaningful ways of life
across the full range of human activities” (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 76). If an
individual leaves its societal culture and joins a new societal culture, they will
be confronted with a different set of common institutions, a different common
language and different ‘culturally significant’ ways of life.
The link between liberalism and cultural membership in Kymlicka’s theory
emerges from the freedom of choice, which is fundamental to liberal theory. In
liberal societies, the individual is free to choose and revise their own
conception of the good life (Kymlicka, 1995). ‘The good life’ represents an
individual’s own perception of a fulfilling life, as shaped by the options made
available to them. As societal cultures provide meaningful options for their
members, in terms of the various ways they can lead their lives, it becomes an
inherent right for individuals to be granted membership in a societal culture
to obtain the freedom of choice (Kymlicka, 1995). Members of a societal
culture attach value to the options available to them and from within this
context decide on their current conception of the good life. Thus, without
access to a societal culture, individuals are deprived of their right to the
freedom of choice. The ability to choose their conception of the good life
becomes significantly diminished when cultural membership fails to be
obtained (Kymlicka, 1995).
Individuals who do not obtain cultural membership to a societal culture are
more likely to become marginalised within that society. As Kymlicka argues,
“if a culture is decaying or discriminated against, ‘the options and
opportunities open to its members will shrink, become less attractive, and
their pursuit [of the good life] less likely to be successful’.” (Margaret & Raz
cited in Kymlicka, 1995, p. 89). Cultural membership is therefore fundamental
to individual freedom. This connection frames Kymlicka’s initial argument for
collective rights in liberal societies.
Kymlicka’s second justification for collective rights is based on the liberal
principle of equality. Kymlicka perceives minority groups as the bearers of an
inherent and unchosen inequality due to the majoritarian nature of societies
(Kymlicka, 1995). Liberal theory supports the notion that all citizens deserve
to have equal rights. In traditional liberal theory, this means individual rights
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should be equally disseminated among all members of a society, regardless of
ethnicity or race (Kymlicka, 1995, 2001). However, Kymlicka highlights that
individual rights alone do not ensure equality but rather perpetuate
inequality. What maintains this inequality is the tendency for liberal
democracies to make decisions that appeal to the needs and desires of the
majority (Kymlicka, 1995).
For Indigenous groups living within a larger societal culture, decisions that
favour the majority can threaten the survival of their own pre-existing societal
culture (Kymlicka, 1995, 2001). In absence of collective rights to protect
Indigenous traditions, members of this group risk losing their cultural
membership. As cultural membership is required to ensure individual
freedom and autonomy, Indigenous people suffer a deep inequality due to
majoritarian decisions (Kymlicka, 1995, 2001). Kymlicka’s theory creates a
mandate for liberal democracies to accommodate collective rights in order to
satisfy the liberal principles of individual freedom and equality.

Allen Buchanan: Collective Land Rights
Allen Buchanan’s theory on collective land rights for Indigenous groups relies
less on the principles of liberalism to advocate for these rights. Buchanan in
his essay, The Role of Collective Rights in the Theory of Indigenous Peoples’
Rights (1993), distinguishes two types of collective land rights that limit the
power of the state and government to varying degrees. The first is collective
property rights, which provide the same function as individual title but with
collective ownership. The second is collective land regulatory rights, which
embody a greater capacity to control resources and development. The latter
threatens the authority of the state and government, as the right-holder has
the power to regulate the use of the land (Buchanan, 1993). The Australian
native title system resembles the former, as the government has the authority
to proceed with development without the consent of Indigenous groups on the
grounds of public interest.
Buchanan contends that there is a need to adopt collective rights for
Indigenous groups, as the rights attributed solely to individuals in the United
Nations Declaration of Human Rights fail to recognise people of a distinctly
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different history and culture (Buchanan, 1993). The Declaration treats all
individuals as equal rights-holders. However, Buchanan argues that the
history and culture of distinct groups such as Indigenous peoples warrants
collective rights to protect pre-existing ways of life.
Buchanan predominately justifies collective land rights for Indigenous groups
on three grounds. Collective land rights can be justified as the initial step to
reconcile historical injustice; a restoration of the collective property system
that existed prior to colonialism; and a means to ensure the survival of an
Indigenous culture (Buchanan, 1993). These justifications have a strong focus
on reconciliation with Indigenous groups that have experienced dispossession
of land. His essay explores some of the motivations behind Indigenous
demands for collective land rights. A major factor is the desire to have preexisting methods of land ownership prior to the advent of colonialism
returned into practice.
Buchanan does make an additional justification based on the importance of
cultural membership. As culture provides meaningful options to individuals,
the preservation of culture ensures that cultural membership is maintained
(Buchanan, 1993). This final premise overlaps with Kymlicka’s justification for
collective rights within the liberal principles of freedom and autonomy, for
which cultural membership is a central component.
While Kymlicka and Buchanan’s theories do provide some similar moral
grounds for collective rights, the predominant justifications in both theories
largely differ. Kymlicka seeks justification within the principles of liberalism
whereas Buchanan bases his reasoning on the rectification of past injustice
and reconciliation. However, both theories can be attributed to the broader
framework of liberal culturalism.

Critical Race Theory
Critical race theory (CRT) is a subset of critical theory that examines the role
of race, racism and power in society. CRT views race as an influential factor in
the outcome of legal cases (Bell, 1995; Darity, 2007). In its initial years, the
movement criticised the legal system in the United States for reinforcing
racism and inequality. However, this perspective has expanded to examine the
12

Kate Arnautovic, 2017
role of race in other disciplines such as political science and education. Critical
race theorists view racism as a construct that is engrained in the social fabric
of Western capitalist societies (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012).
Despite the presence of laws that aim to counter discrimination and inequality
such as affirmative action regimes, subtle forms of racism remain embedded
in state institutions (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012; Hutchinson, 2004). Critical
race theorists share the belief that race is a common and ordinary occurrence.
It is a phenomenon that is normalised and embedded into everyday life, which
often makes it difficult to detect for those living in the majority (Delgado &
Stefancic, 2012; Gillborn, 2005). While explicit forms of racism such as
denying the right to vote have been curtailed with modern anti-discrimination
laws, CRT contends that business-as-usual racism remains deeply prevalent in
society. This form of racism is institutionalised and ensures that power
remains in the hands of the dominant white class (Bracey, 2015; Delgado &
Stefancic, 2012; Gillborn, 2005).
CRT contends that state institutions and government consciously and
unconsciously ensure that white people continue to dominate positions of
power and maintain control over material resources (Delgado & Stefancic,
2012; Gillborn, 2005). Bell (1980) establishes the concept of interest
convergence, whereby racial remedies for blacks are accommodated on the
basis that the rights afforded to them are compatible with the interests of
whites. At the very least, black rights must not jeopardise white interests.
Harris (1993) builds on this idea, arguing that over time the legal system has
legitimised white privilege and a set of power-based presumptions are
inherently attached to all whites. Thus, racial remedies will be amended or
reversed if they disrupt the white expectation of power and control (Bell,
1980; Bracey, 2015; Delgado & Stefancic, 2012). Bracey (2015) cites Bell
(2004) in his analysis on the white class and its dominance over state affairs,
“Whites’ control of the state is permanent and absolute, as evinced by their
collective power to abrogate racial justice policies ‘at the point that
policymakers fear the remedial policy is threatening the superior social status
of whites’.” (p. 558).
CRT can be applied to the Australian context to understand the winding back
of Indigenous land rights afforded under the NTA. The native title system
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essentially represents a bundle of rights granted to blacks. However, these
rights are carried out in white institutions and are subject to the decisions of
white-dominated political leaderships. When native title rights have been
found to challenge the power and control that government exerts over land,
the legislation is amended and ‘watered down’. As critical race theorists
Delgado and Stefancic (2012) purport, “rights are almost always cut back
when they conflict with the interests of the powerful” (p. 29).
This is illustrated in the Howard Government’s amendments to weaken the
NTA following the Wik decision. The Federal Government’s scramble to amend
the Act in response to the recent McGlade decision also demonstrates the
reluctance of political leaders to situate black interests ahead of large mining
developments on traditional land. The decision of former Prime Minister Paul
Keating to legislate native title rather than allow Mabo to determine the
outcome of similar court challenges by way of common law further supports
the arguments of CRT. As reflected in these examples, CRT would contend that
whites accommodate racial remedies on the basis that it does not harm the
interests of white institutions and government.
It can also be observed that the rights included in the NTA, particularly in the
future act process this thesis examines, can be overridden if the interests of
traditional owners obstruct the interests of those in power. Thus, while black
rights have been accommodated to remedy past wrongdoings and set the
nation on a path towards reconciliation, these rights have been crafted to
remain subordinate to the powers of the white dominant class.

Research Questions and Thesis Structure
Research question:
•

To what extent have state institutions and government taken into
account Indigenous rights and interests during the phases of approval
for the Adani Carmichael Coal Mine?
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Research sub-questions:
•

What degree of power and influence do resource companies like Adani
exercise in Australian politics? (Chapter 2)

•

What factors contributed to the collapse of negotiations? (Chapter 3
and 4)

•

Why did the Wangan and Jagalingou community become divided in the
course of negotiations? (Chapter 4)

•

How did the NNTT, the State Government and Adani respond to
Indigenous rights and interests during the phases of approval?
(Chapter 4 and 5)

•

To what extent have Members of Parliament taken into consideration
Indigenous rights and interests during the phases of approval?
(Chapter 5)

Chapter Two will examine the degree of power resource companies exert in
Australian politics and determine whether Adani reflects a similar level of
influence.
Chapter Three will examine how the first phase of negotiations operated
under the NTA and determine what factors contributed to the unresolved
outcome.
Chapter Four will examine the next phase of approval, whereby the failure to
produce an agreement leads to the involvement of the State. This chapter will
investigate the process of arbitration and the community division that
emerged thereafter.
Chapter Five will examine the response of Adani and the State Government
when negotiations fail to produce an agreement and arbitration is sought for a
second time. This chapter will then investigate the degree of recognition and
oversight of Indigenous issues by government in the approval process and
discuss the effect of the recent McGlade decision.
The concluding chapter will compare the findings of this study to the existing
literature and assess the capacity for each theory to explain the research
outcomes.

15

Kate Arnautovic, 2017

Methodology
Document Analysis
Document analysis is a common methodology employed in qualitative studies.
It involves the systematic analysis of organisational and institutional
documents to build understanding and contextualise events and phenomena.
The process requires the selection of multiple documents relevant to the
research problem and the evaluation and synthesis of the data found in those
documents (Bowen, 2009).
This thesis will use document analysis to investigate a single case study. This
type of methodology is often used in case study research to develop an
understanding of a specific phenomenon or event. In this case, a range of
documents will be reviewed and evaluated to detail each phase of approval.
Comparing the data in each document will aim to verify and confirm
important information about the approval process and, in turn, determine the
extent to which state institutions and government have taken into account
Indigenous rights and interests, and if this is a sufficient protection of these
rights and interests.
Case Study
Case study research involves the in-depth analysis of a single sample. This
methodology requires detailed and descriptive content about one specific
phenomenon or event (Pierce, 2008). This thesis will examine a single
instance where state institutions and government have had to consider the
rights and interests of an Indigenous group in the approval process of a
significant mining development project.
The Carmichael Coal Mine is a highly exposed and polarising example of a
recent large mining development that has placed the Australian native title
system under the lens and tested the existing legislation. This thesis aims to
develop broad conclusions that may be applied to other instances where a
large mining development has challenged the State and government’s
consideration of Indigenous rights and interests.
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Employment of Theory
This thesis will employ multiple theories to interpret and understand the
outcomes of a single case study. While each theoretical perspective will be
applied to develop a critical understanding of the findings, the practical
implementation of each framework will assess its applicability in a real life
event. The application of multiple theories that are relevant to the research
problem is intended to provide explanation and insight into the response of
state institutions and government.

Problem and Significance
This thesis will determine the extent to which state institutions and
government have taken into account Indigenous rights and interests during
the approval process of a large mining development. It will determine whether
Indigenous land rights in Australia have fully mandated the consideration of
Indigenous rights and interests in each phase of approval. A series of
theoretical perspectives will be employed to explain the research outcomes.
This study will compare a recent case to the existing body of literature on
Indigenous land rights and mining developments in Australia. The findings
may confirm or counter the literature and may also support or challenge the
criticisms of the NTA as a weak apparatus for Indigenous groups seeking to
protect their rights to land.
The use of multiple theories to explain the outcomes of the approval process
offers an additional contribution to the literature. There are a number of
studies that examine cases where the interests of Indigenous groups and the
rights afforded to them under the NTA and the UNDRIP have been affected by
mining developments (Altman, 2009; Corbett & O’Faircheallaigh, 2006;
O’Faircheallaigh, 2006, 2008; Scambary, 2013). However, theoretical
perspectives have been scarcely employed to explain the inadequacies of
Indigenous land rights in Australia’s jurisdiction and the attitudes of state
institutions and government.
While there appears to be a consensus in the literature that the NTA has failed
to uphold Indigenous rights and interests, there are few studies that provide a
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deeper source of explanation beyond the inherent weaknesses of the
legislation. This thesis seeks to account for the failure of the native title system
using the application of multiple social theories.
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Chapter 2
Resource Politics
Australia is a resource-rich nation and the energy and mining industry has
contributed significantly to the national economy. While it is a common
misconception that Australia’s economy is largely bound to expendable energy
and mining production, the mining sector only contributes around 8 per cent
to the nation’s GDP (Frydenberg, 2015; Garnett, 2015; Roarty, 2010).
However, the resources sector continues to occupy a prominent position on
the national agenda as it delivers many benefits to the state, contributing to
export earnings, employment, foreign and domestic investment, and to
government revenue (Roarty, 2010).
The national reliance on energy and mining has enabled large resource
companies to become highly influential in Australian politics (Baer, 2014;
Hodder, 2009; Lyons, 2016). The carbon lobby has exercised significant power
to influence key policymakers and public opinion. While the government
ensures transparency for certain lobbying practices, many cases of lobbying
are conducted off the record (Readfearn, 2015). The mining industry engages
in a high level of government lobbying and enjoys a close relationship with the
Australian Government. There is a revolving door whereby individuals move
between positions in the resource industry and public office. This close
exchange may compromise the independence of government decision-making
and increase the influence of energy and mining interests (Aulby & Ogge,
2016; Hodder, 2009; Readfearn, 2015).
The conduct of Adani mirrors the approach of many large resource companies
that have aimed to influence Australian politics. Adani has employed multiple
lobbying strategies, including monetary donations, personal gifts, private
meetings and the strategic hiring of several former government executives of
Queensland (Aulby & Ogge, 2016; Cox, 2015b; Readfearn, 2015). Adani has
received widespread criticism by countless interest groups locally and
Australia-wide. Despite sustained opposition to the Carmichael Project and
the refusal of Australian-owned banks to finance the project, the Queensland
Government has continued to tender approvals (Bell-James, 2015; Haxton,
2015; Milman, 2015; Tlozek, 2015). This raises the question as to whether the
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decision to issue controversial grants and approvals are made independently
and with equal consideration of other interest groups that do not enjoy the
same access to government as the energy and mining industry.
Australia produces a wide range of energy sources, including oil, coal,
aluminum and iron ore. The nation strongly relies on coal as a source of
electricity and export (Baer, 2014; Healey, 2012). Australia’s domestic use of
coal to generate electricity ranks it fifth in the world. Coal generates 85 per
cent of grid-connected electricity across the nation, and prior to 2011
Australia was the world’s largest coal exporter (Hodder, 2009; Baer, 2014;
Crowley, 2013). Australia currently provides 30 per cent of coal exports
around the globe. While Australia’s global reputation as an energy and mining
powerhouse situates it among the world’s resource heavyweights such as
China, the United States and India, mineral resources in Australia seldom
belong to local mining industries and instead rest in the hands of a few
majority foreign-owned transnational corporations (Goodman & Worth,
2008). These large energy and mining companies enjoy a close relationship
with the Australian Government and have the economic power to devote
millions towards lobbying for their interests.
Energy and mining companies lobby the government either directly or
through lobbying firms. Lobbying can include contributions to political
parties, gifts, private meetings or media engagement (Baer, 2014; Hodder,
2009). It is a legal requirement that certain lobbying practices are recorded on
a formal public register. However, many operate outside this requirement and
remain undisclosed to the public. Australian law does not require political
donations under $12,100 to be formally registered and this highlights a lack of
transparency in the system (Readfearn, 2015). Lobbying conducted in secrecy
is a common and concerning practice that increases the opportunity for
misconduct and institutional corruption. Transparency of governance is
reduced and accountability diminishes when lobbying activities are not
formally recorded. There is an entrusted expectation that government officials
will make decisions independent of influence and in the interests of the public.
Liberal democratic governance is based on transparency and accountability.
Fukuyama (2015) states that democratic accountability “seeks to ensure that
government acts in the interests of the whole community, rather than simply
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in the self-interest of the rulers” (p. 12). When the government’s actions seek
to benefit the whole community, the public interest is prioritised and the
moral legitimacy of the democratic system is upheld (Beresford, 2010).
However, when the government makes decisions in favour of other interest
groups rather than the public interest, its moral legitimacy becomes
compromised. Institutional corruption can manifest when the government is
less accountable to the public. Government accountability is maintained
through transparency and when a democracy lacks transparency, it becomes
vulnerable to institutional corruption. A high level of public disclosure ensures
that government officials remain accountable and decisions are made with the
public interest at heart (Beresford, 2010). Australia’s weak lobbying laws
reduce transparency and increase the risk of institutional corruption. The
power of the carbon lobby unveils, to some extent, the uneven influence
energy and mining companies have over government decisions and party
policies.
Perhaps the most straightforward form of lobbying is monetary donations to
political parties. Political donations on the surface appear to be a one-way
flow of funds from a donor to a recipient, in good faith and impartial of vested
interests. However, political donations are more realistically viewed as single
or multiple transactions by which the donor gives and then gains something in
return. Political donations are often made to gain some degree of political
advantage (Hodder, 2009). Energy and mining companies donate with the
expectation that political parties will favour their developments and expedite
approvals. Large and sustained political donations are a concerning practice,
as it introduces bias into the decision-making process (Aulby & Ogge, 2016).
In some cases, it can be observed that political donations correspond with
favourable decisions for the donors.
Political donations in Australia are legal and commonplace (Hodder, 2009).
Mining and energy companies have made sizable donations to both sides of
politics. Since the 1980s, the Liberal and Labor parties have received millions
in corporate donations (Baer, 2014; McKnight & Hobbs, 2013). Mining
companies have made donations directly and indirectly through industry
lobby groups and associations. The Australian Coal Association (ACA)
represents coal mining interests in Queensland and New South Wales and has
made large donations to both major political parties since the 1990s (Baer,
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2014; Hodder, 2009). Other industry lobby groups such as the Australian
Industry Greenhouse Network (AIGN), a cross-industry group representing
several major energy and mining corporations, has donated millions to the
Liberal Party and Australian Labor Party (ALP) since 1998 (Baer, 2014;
Hodder, 2009). The mining industry is a wealthy conglomerate of
transnational corporations and lobbyists that can afford to donate millions to
increase the likeliness that policy leans in their favour.
There have been two reports released that examine the Queensland
Government’s lack of transparency and disclosure of lobbying activities.
Readfearn’s (2015) report on the political influence of coal and gas lobbyists
in Queensland uncovered a string of generous donations to the Liberal
National Party (LNP). In 2007, when the government rejected the Australian
energy company New Hope’s proposal to expand its Darling Downs coal mine,
the company donated $950,000 to the Federal Liberal Party between 2008
and 2011. In 2014, New Hope’s expansion was approved under the LNP
Newman Government (Aulby & Ogge, 2016; Readfearn, 2015). This example
illustrates how large donations to political parties can influence key decisionmakers in government and, in turn, effectuate corporate objectives.
Aulby and Ogge’s (2016) report examines the legislative outcomes in specific
cases where the Queensland Government has been exposed to multiple
lobbying tactics. The findings of the report observe a significant disparity
between mining related donations to the Federal ALP and the Federal Liberal
Party. Between 2011 and 2015, the Labor Party accepted approximately $1.2
million whereas the Liberal Party accepted nearly $3 million. During this time,
there were six controversial mining developments pending approval in
Newman-led Queensland. The LNP Newman Government received over $1
million from the mining industry over the same period (Aulby & Ogge, 2016).
Corresponding with their generous donations to the LNP and Federal Liberal
Party, the mining companies seeking approvals in Queensland received
desirable legislative outcomes under the LNP (Aulby & Ogge, 2016). It is clear
that political parties routinely receive large donations from the mining sector
and such contributions can compromise independent and unbiased decisionmaking.

22

Kate Arnautovic, 2017
Evidence of the link between political donations and government decisions
casts doubts upon the level of institutional corruption at work in Australian
politics. While sizable donations from a multiplicity of corporations in the
mining industry have flowed into the pockets of political parties for years,
governments have acted favourably in return. The Australian Government has
given energy and mining companies large subsidies for their developments
and expansion (Baer, 2014). Government expenditure on subsidies for the
mining sector is an expensive investment. The Queensland Government spent
$9 billion on mining projects between 2009 and 2014 (Aulby & Ogge, 2016).
Energy and mining companies enjoy a privileged level of access to government
(Aulby & Ogge, 2016; Hodder, 2009; Readfearn, 2015). Industry leaders can
pay for access to events where politicians are present (Readfearn, 2015). In
Queensland, both the LNP and Labor have established subscription-based
schemes where corporations ‘buy-in’ to attend exclusive events with key
politicians. Labor’s Queensland Progressive Business Network (QPBN) scheme
charged corporations $10,000 a year for a subscription to events. The LNP’s
QForum scheme promised corporations such as Hancock Coal, Caltex and
Peabody Energy one-on-one access to ministers (Aulby & Ogge, 2016;
Readfearn, 2015).
These ‘cash for access’ schemes have been kept highly secretive and are not
inclusive of other interest groups such as those with environmental or
agricultural concerns (Readfearn, 2015). The establishment of QPBN and
QForum encourages a direct engagement with government that can go
unrecorded. These fundraising forums allow the lobbying of key policymakers
to be conducted behind closed doors, without disclosure to the public. As
Hodder (2009) asserts, “Although legal, these activities are generally hidden
because broad exposure would reveal the disproportionate access and
influence that certain powerful actors within the system enjoy” (p. 58).
Judging the independence of government decision-making becomes
problematic when direct access is attainable for some wealthy interest groups
and not others. While the red carpet is rolled out for the heads of energy and
mining companies to ‘rub shoulders’ with key decision-makers, many other
groups do not enjoy the same level of access to government (Hodder, 2009).
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There is a revolving door between the resource sector and the public office of
government (Aulby & Ogge, 2016; Readfearn, 2015). In many cases, former
Queensland politicians and their staff have left government to work as
lobbyists for energy and mining firms and then returned to politics months or
years later. The opposite has also occurred where lobbyists for the resource
sector have obtained influential positions in public office and then returned to
the lobby world. The unrestrained movement of staff between the public office
and the resource sector raises a considerable conflict of interest (Aulby &
Ogge, 2016; Readfearn, 2015). It is concerning when politicians tasked with
regulating development are found to have held prominent positions in the
energy and mining industry. This conflict of interest may lead to the
preferential treatment and prioritisation of certain development projects and
less consideration given to other stakeholders in the community.
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Adani and Australian politics

2012 - 2013
Financial
Year

$6,600 to LP
$7,200 to ALP

No approvals

2013 - 2014
Financial
Year

$49,500 to LP
$11,000 to
ALP

8 May
Queensland
approves mine

2014 - 2015
Financial
Year

$7,000 to LNP
$5,500 to ALP

24 July
Commonwealth
approves mine

LP: Liberal Party, ALP: Australian Labor Party, LNP: Liberal National Party
Figure 1.1 Adani's contributions to political parties
Consistent with the experiences of numerous energy and mining companies,
Adani has enjoyed direct access to Australian politicians, ministers and
bureaucrats. Adani has actively lobbied the Commonwealth and Queensland
Government through political contributions, gifts to ministers, private
meetings and the strategic hiring of influential former government executives
(Aulby & Ogge, 2016; Cox, 2015b; Readfearn, 2015). When compared with the
lobbying activities of other multinational corporations that have a vested
interest, Adani ticks all the boxes. The Carmichael Coal Mine has made its way
through Australia’s approval process, whereby the State and Federal
Government has approved and re-approved mining leases for the project
(Bell-James, 2015). While it is difficult to determine whether a link exists
between the lobbying activities of Adani and the tender of approvals, it is
evident that the company wields a disproportionate influence and access to
government compared to many other interest groups.
The Electoral Commission of Queensland (ECQ) revealed Adani’s
contributions to both sides of politics over the past five years. Contributions
on the ECQ’s record are listed for each financial year. In the 2012-2013
financial year Adani paid $7,200 to the ALP for attendance at the 2013 Budget
Dinner and Post-Budget Lunch (ECQ, 2013). In the same period, the Federal
Liberal Party received $6,600 for attendance at a business advisory lunch
(Australian Electoral Commission [AEC], 2013). Contributions increase
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significantly in the following financial year. Between 2013-2014 Adani paid
$49,500 to the Federal Liberal Party and $11,000 to the ALP (AEC, 2014). In
the financial year 2014-2015, Adani contributed $7,000 to the LNP and $5,500
to the ALP. The ECQ did not specify a reason for the contributions made by
Adani from July 2013 to June 2015 (ECQ, 2015).
Adani operates its lobbying through Queensland-based firm Next Level
Strategic Services (NLSS). NLSS has made contributions to the LNP in excess of
$52,000 since 2013 (ECQ, 2013a, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2016, 2016a). While
Adani is one of 10 clients managed by NLSS (Australian Government, 2017),
the contributions these firms make to political parties promote the interests of
the companies they represent.
Based on the premise that political contributions are made to encourage
desirable outcomes for the donor, the approvals issued by the Commonwealth
and Queensland Government for the Carmichael Coal Mine in May and July of
2014 coincide with Adani’s contributions of over $60,000 to the Federal
Liberal Party and ALP. These two approvals were tendered under the
Newman and Abbott governments. In comparison to the contributions made
to the ALP, the Liberal Party received considerably larger contributions prior
to its endorsement of the Carmichael Project. In August 2013, the Deputy
Premier Jeff Seeney and his chief of staff both received gifts from Adani jointly
valued at over $1,000 (Aulby & Ogge, 2016; Queensland Government, 2013).
While Adani’s contributions to both federal and state divisions of political
parties significantly diminished following the 2013-2014 financial year,
company executives continued to meet regularly with ministers.
Adani has sustained countless private meetings with the heads of government
in Queensland. Between 2013 and 2014 Adani had 12 private meetings with
ministers of the Newman Government, including six meetings with the Deputy
Premier (Aulby & Ogge, 2016). Since the defeat of the Newman Government in
2015, Adani has obtained 21 private meetings with the Palaszczuk Ministry
and the Opposition (Queensland Integrity Commissioner [QIC], 2016). Adani
has met with policy advisors to the Queensland Premier Anastasia Palaszczuk
on eight occasions and twice with the Premier. Policy advisors and the chief of
staff to the Minister for State Development, Natural Resources and Mines,
Anthony Lynham, have had five meetings with Adani, one meeting including
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the Minister. Other private meetings involved the Deputy Premier Jackie Trad,
the Leader of the Opposition Tim Nicholls, several Members of Parliament and
the Mayor of Townsville (Aulby & Ogge, 2016; QIC, 2016). Adani has sustained
direct access to both sides of politics in Queensland.
Adani has pursued a range of internal lobbying tactics, strategically employing
former government executives with knowledge relevant to the oversight of
developments. There are a number of staffers working for Adani that have
strong connections to the major political parties in Queensland (Cox, 2015b).
The former Deputy Premier’s chief of staff David Moore and former Leader of
the Opposition’s chief of staff Cameron Milner jointly own the lobbying firm
NLSS (Cox, 2015b; Rose, 2015; Readfearn, 2015). NLSS has facilitated private
meetings between Adani and the government (QIC, 2016).
Lobbyists David Moore and Cameron Milner have held a number of influential
roles in public office. Moore has left and returned to government several
times. After serving as John Howard’s chief of staff for 10 years, Moore left
public office to start a lobbying firm. He then left the private sector for a 12month period to work as Campbell Newman’s chief of staff in 2011 (NLSS,
2013). Milner entered the private sector after working as the ALP state
secretary in Queensland. He left his position as co-director at NLSS in 2015 to
serve as Bill Shorten’s chief of staff. After 10 months, Milner returned to the
lobby world (Maiden, 2016; NLSS, 2013). Moore and Milner’s movements
between private enterprise and public office reflect the revolving door
between government and the resource sector.
Adani has a long track record of non-compliance with environmental laws
overseas. This has failed to deter or delay the Australian Government’s
approvals for the Carmichael Coal Mine (Earth Justice & Environmental Justice
Australia, 2015; Reside, Mappin, Watson, Chapman & Kearney, 2016). The
potential environmental impacts of the development will put at risk 69,000
full-time jobs dependent on the Great Barrier Reef (Blain, 2016; Moore, 2015;
Robertson, 2015a). When compared to an estimated 1,500 full-time jobs
generated to operate the Carmichael Coal Mine (Branco, 2015a; Campbell,
2015), the prospect of endangering a world heritage listed site and major
tourism hub for Australia seems an unnecessary and high-risk endeavour.
Moreover, the construction of the world’s second largest coal mine is at odds
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with the global awareness of climate change and the consequences of high
carbon emission developments (Bell-James, 2015; Blain, 2016; Reside,
Mappin, Watson, Chapman & Kearney, 2016).
Despite a number of serious allegations against Adani’s mining operations
overseas, the Australian Government has continued to support the project and
advance its approval. Adani currently faces numerous allegations of financial
crime and corruption involving fraud, money laundering, and bribery (Aulby &
Ogge, 2016; Long, 2016; Robertson, 2016a). The company has struggled to
secure investment, as Australian and international banks have been reluctant
to provide funding. There have already been 11 international banks that have
refused to invest in the Carmichael Project (Haxton, 2015; Milman, 2015;
Tlozek, 2015).
In August 2015, the Australian Commonwealth Bank suspended its role as
Adani’s financial advisor. This is a significant move that suggests the
Commonwealth Bank views the development as commercially unviable
(Tlozek, 2015). The Queensland Treasury has raised similar concerns and has
deemed the project ‘unbankable’. The Treasury has highlighted the company’s
large debts and this has cast doubts on its financial capacity to deliver the
proposed project (Cox, 2015).
Energy and financial analysts have labelled the Carmichael Coal Mine
development a risky investment due to Adani’s record of debt, the accusations
of financial crime and India’s plan to discontinue coal imports (Briggs, 2016;
Robertson & Safi, 2016). The Indian Government has declared it intends to
phase out coal imports. This is a significant policy shift that the Australian
Government must take into consideration. Analysts have predicted that the
Carmichael Project will become a ‘stranded asset’ if India continues to turn to
alternatives sources of energy (Milman, 2015; Long, 2016). The success of the
proposed development in the Galilee Basin is dependent on India’s coal
reliance. The prominence of coal as a key energy source for electricity in India
is becoming an increasingly unlikely prospect.
Adani’s history of non-compliance with environmental laws doubled with
numerous allegations of financial crime greatly challenges its suitability to
operate in Australia. However, at every stage the Australian Government has
continued to issue approvals for the Carmichael Coal Mine. It appears the only
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setback to the project is the actions of concerned interest groups that have
held the government and Adani to account (Wellington, 2016). The Federal
and State Government’s undue support for Adani at each phase of the
approval process, despite evidence that suggests the project is both a
financially and environmentally risky investment for Australia, raises the
concern that the actions of government are not independent of influence.
The Australian Government appears to have ignored all the warning signs and
has unequivocally handed Adani its approvals. In consideration of the
consistent lobbying efforts of the mining giant and its direct access to key
policymakers, it is possible that Adani and the coal lobby have exercised a
disproportionate level of influence in Australian politics. The result has
conceived a series of decision outcomes in favour of the second largest coal
development in the world.
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Chapter 3
The First Phase of Negotiations
Since the Wangan and Jagalingou people received the first notification of the
Carmichael Project in late 2011, negotiations took a prolonged and
controversial course. The task of reaching an agreement involved significant
state intervention. Within a five-year period, between 2012 and 2016, the
Wangan and Jagalingou people rejected three Indigenous Land Use
Agreements (ILUA) put forward by Adani (Borschmann, 2015; Davidson,
2017; Robertson, 2016b). Adani approached the National Native Title Tribunal
(NNTT) on two occasions and both times the NNTT delivered a ruling in
favour of the mining leases.
Before the ILUA was signed in April 2016, there were two periods of
negotiations that failed to produce an agreement. The first between May 2011
and December 2012 concerned the mining lease (ML) 70441 (Adani Mining v.
Jessie Diver & Others, 2013). The second between October 2013 and October
2014 concerned two additional mining leases, ML 70505 and ML 70506
(Adani Mining v. Adrian Burragubba & Others, 2015). Negotiations on both
counts were unable to secure an ILUA between Adani and the Wangan and
Jagalingou people. The collapse of negotiations prompted Adani to pass the
matter to the NNTT twice, a move that delivered desirable outcomes for the
mining giant and effectively sidelined the concerns of the Indigenous group.
The Native Title Act (NTA) has established a two-pronged system that consists
of claims and future acts. Indigenous groups make claims that are either
determined, pending determination (as registered or unregistered claims), or
rejected. The Wangan and Jagalingou people have a registered claim that is
pending determination (NNTT, 2004). The future act system operates
separately from claims and concerns any proposed activity that may infringe
native title rights and interests (NNTT, 2017a). Future acts include activities
such as infrastructure, mineral exploration, pastoral leases or mining projects
(QSNTS, 2017; NNTT, 2009; NTSCORP, 2017).
Registered claimants are entitled to a number of procedural rights in relation
to future acts. Procedural rights range from the right to lodge an objection to
the right to negotiate compensation or conditions attached to a future act
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(QSNTS, 2017; NNTT, 2009; NTSCORP, 2017). The level of procedural rights
granted depends on the size and impact of the future act and its proximity to
the claim area. As mining developments can lead to the extinguishment of
native title, the NTA mandates that the mining interest negotiates a land use
agreement with the registered claimants. Where resource companies seek to
have mining leases granted for new projects near or within a registered claim
area, the right to negotiate (RTN) ensues (NNTT, 2016, 2017c; NTSCORP,
2017).
The Wangan and Jagalingou people have been granted the RTN as the
proposed Carmichael Coal Mine resides entirely inside their registered claim
area. Negotiations are conducted independently between the native title
applicant and the mining interest (QSNTS, 2017). When a native title
application is made, the claimants appoint one or more persons, referred to as
the ‘applicant’, to represent the interests of the group as a whole. The claim
group appoint applicants through a traditional decision-making process or an
appropriate alternative method of their choice. The applicants speak on behalf
of the claim group and make decisions in relation to the claim (Duff, 2017;
NNTT, 2008, 2009; NTSCORP, 2012).
The Wangan and Jagalingou claimants, who constitute 400 to 500 people, have
appointed applicants on three occasions (Burragubba & Johnson, 2015; de
Tarczynski, 2016; Jishnu, 2015). These applicants have dealt directly with
Adani in the course of negotiations. The NTA requires negotiations to be
conducted for a minimum of six months before parties can request the State to
arbitrate the matter. However, negotiations can extend for any length of time
provided that all parties continue in good faith of reaching an agreement
(NNTT, 2008a, 2016; NTSCORP, 2017). Negotiations in both cases have
exceeded the six-month minimum and Adani has requested that the State
intervene.
This chapter will involve extensive analysis of the NNTT’s future act
determination Adani Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others (2013) to examine the first
phase of negotiations. This primary source contains a detailed chronology of
correspondence between Adani and the Wangan and Jagalingou applicants
from May 2011 to December 2012. It is a significant legal document that
exceeds 100 pages and recounts the series of disputes that led to the collapse
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of negotiations. While this document provides excerpts of correspondence,
such as emails, letters and affidavits, full submissions made to the NNTT are
not publicly available. The author contacted the NNTT and requested the full
release of submissions to strengthen this analysis. However, none were made
available. While the document is still critical for this study, as it provides a
comprehensive account of negotiations, the denial of access limits the
transparency of the process. During the first phase of negotiations there was
minimal media coverage or commentary to support the findings of the NNTT’s
determination. The conclusions made in this chapter have been formed
through in depth analysis of the available evidence in Adani Mining v. Jessie
Diver & Others (2013).
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2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

• May - tirst negotiation phase commences
• 2 November - notitication of mining lease for Carmichael Coal Mine

• 7 November - Adani tiles tirst future act determination application
• 29 November - Campbell Newman leads seven-day trade mission to India
• 1 December - WJ claimants reject ILUA
• December - tirst negotiation phase concludes
• 7 May - tirst future act determination (ML 70441 may be done)
• 30 October - notitication of two mining leases for Carmichael Coal Mine
• October - second negotiation phase commences
• 8 May - Queensland Coordinator-General approves Carmichael Coal Mine
• 24 July - Federal Environmental Minister approves Carmichael Coal Mine
• 7 August - three native title applicants replace seven applicants
• 5 October - WJ claimants reject ILUA
• 10 October - Adani tiles second future act determination application
• October - second negotiation phase concludes
• 5 April - second future act determination (ML 70505, 70506 may be done)
• 21 August - 12 native title applicants replace three applicants
• 2 October - WJ Family Council make submission to United Nations
• 14 October - Federal Environmental Minister re-approves mine

2016

• 19 March - ILUA is rejected at a claim group meeting
• 3 April - Queensland Government issue ML 70441, 70505, 70506 to Adani
• 16 April - ILUA is authorised at a contested Adani-convened meeting
• 22 June - NNTT registers ILUA and WJ Family Council lodge objection
• 19 August - Federal Court rejects WJ Family Council's judicial review
• 25 November - Supreme Court rejects WJ Family Counci's judicial review

2017

• 2 February - McGlade decision
• ILUA authorised in April 2016 may be invalidated
Figure 2.2 Adani Carmichael Coal Mine development timeline
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Negotiation Breakdown
The first phase of negotiations between Adani and the Wangan and Jagalingou
people failed to produce an agreement. Based on the available evidence, it
appears that the native title applicants had negotiated in good faith of
reaching an agreement (Adani Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013). The
applicants did not abandon or disengage from negotiations at any stage, but
continued to work towards an ILUA that would create long-term benefits for
the Wangan and Jagalingou community. The failure to settle a deal with Adani
can be attributed to a variety of factors. The Wangan and Jagalingou applicants
and Adani had misaligned expectations in relation to the status and schedule
of negotiations. As a result, Adani sought authorisation from a third party to
meet its deadline and this was perceived as an attempt to undermine the
authority of the applicants. The applicants were ultimately dissatisfied with
the deal on offer, as the terms of agreement were not sensitive to key
Indigenous interests (Adani Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013).

Unaligned Expectations
The first phase of negotiations began in May 2011, prior to the official
notification date for the Carmichael Coal Mine in November 2011.
Negotiations were conducted between Adani and the Wangan and Jagalingou
applicants for 24 months, ending in December 2012. While it appears that
negotiations remained on-track for the majority of this period, the applicants
submitted a number of contentions to the NNTT in relation to their
engagement with Adani (Adani Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013).
Adani’s delayed response to the applicants’ initial position paper was raised as
a concern. The response letter received after a seven-month delay included an
increased geographical scope of consent, an expansion the applicants would
have to consider at length (Adani Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013). While
the applicants’ position paper had been based on the surrender of 2,700
hectares of native title, this area had expanded to 5,060 hectares in Adani’s
response letter. The company had also set the deadline to conclude
negotiations in early October 2012, expecting the applicants to revise their
position in less than three months and consent to the deal on offer. While the
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applicants accepted the expanded surrender of their native title rights in the
revised proposal, they felt under pressure to consent to the agreement within
Adani’s devised timeframe (Adani Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013).
While the applicants had aimed to meet the agreement schedule, “they did not
agree to be committed to the grantee party’s timeframes” (Adani Mining v.
Jessie Diver & Others, 2013, p. 30), nor did they “give an unqualified assurance
that they would [meet the grantee party’s requirements]” (p. 37). At a meeting
in late September 2012, the applicants’ felt that the close deadline was ‘forcing
their hand’ and Adani had ‘pushed hard’ to have the ILUA signed (Adani
Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013).
Earlier in September 2012, a month before Adani expected the agreement to
be authorised, the applicants changed legal representation (Adani Mining v.
Jessie Diver & Others, 2013). This decision highlighted the applicants’ concern
for their interests, as the change occurred when Adani had expanded the
scope of consents. Some of the applicants expressed dissatisfaction with the
direction that negotiations were travelling in under the guidance of the former
legal advisors (Adani Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013). The change also
demonstrated the applicants’ intention to continue negotiations and develop a
stronger agreement. However, it was unlikely that a better deal could be
negotiated in time to meet Adani’s deadline.
Adani’s realisation that the applicants wished to prolong negotiations in order
to settle an improved ILUA created a rift between the two parties. Adani’s
conduct became rigid and unwilling to consider additional terms of
agreement. In a letter and teleconference, the applicants’ legal representative
Chalk & Fitzgerald proposed a life of mine services contract be included in the
agreement (Adani Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013). A life of mine services
contract would involve the partnership of Transfield Services and the Wangan
and Jagalingou community to provide the service and maintenance of the
Carmichael Project camps. The contract would provide long-term benefits for
the community, generating employment opportunities and business
ownership. If the services contract were included, the Wangan and Jagalingou
people were willing to accept the settlement deal. However, Adani contended
that it would not include a life of mine services contract in the ILUA and
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viewed the proposal as an attempt to reset the path of negotiations (Adani
Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013).
While Adani was adamant that the applicants were committed to the
agreement schedule and would sign the ILUA in October 2012, it appears both
parties’ perception of the stage reached in negotiations had become
increasingly unaligned. The applicants were unwilling to give their consent to
the existing terms of agreement in Adani’s best settlement offer (Adani Mining
v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013). As they were dissatisfied with the direction of
negotiations, the applicants changed legal representatives with the hope that
it would assist them to negotiate a stronger agreement. When Adani’s
agreement schedule started to elapse, the applicants attempted to negotiate a
better deal for the Wangan and Jagalingou community through the inclusion of
a life of mine services contract (Adani Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013).
However, their efforts were unsuccessful as Adani was unwilling to
accommodate the contract or extend negotiations. The solution for Adani was
simple, to approach the State for its mining grants and avoid further delay.

Undermining Authority
When the likelihood of having an agreement signed in October 2012 began to
diminish, Adani sought authorisation from a Wangan and Jagalingou affiliate
that had no previous involvement in negotiations. This occurred at the end of
2012, after Adani had filed a future act determination for its mining lease but
the case was still awaiting submissions by all parties.
In December 2012, Adani attempted to sideline the authority of the applicants
and seek authorisation from the Wangan and Jagalingou Traditional Owners
Aboriginal Corporation (WJ Corporation). The WJ Corporation is a
representative body with a board of Wangan and Jagalingou family
representatives (Adani Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013). While its
membership is comprised of many Wangan and Jagalingou claimants, it also
represents people who are not claimants. Patrick Malone told the NNTT that
the membership of the WJ Corporation included ‘large numbers’ of people
who were not descendants of the 12 families that constitute the claim group
(Adani Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013).

36

Kate Arnautovic, 2017
The function of the WJ Corporation is seldom mentioned in the available
evidence, so it is difficult to distinguish the difference between the WJ
Corporation and the Wangan and Jagalingou Family Council (WJ Family
Council). The role of the WJ Family Council will be discussed in the following
chapter. According to the affidavits of the native title applicants in Adani
Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others (2013), the WJ Corporation shared different
views to the applicants and cannot be considered fully representative of the
claim group.
Following Chalk & Fitzgerald’s proposal for a life of mine services contract,
Adani made a final effort to have its proposed ILUA signed. In November 2012,
Adani effectively sidestepped the applicants and began correspondence with
the WJ Corporation and their legal representatives Just Us Lawyers (Adani
Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013). Adani convened a meeting in
collaboration with the WJ Corporation on 1 December 2012 in an attempt to
have the agreement authorised by the Wangan and Jagalingou people. While
the NNTT deemed this approach as ‘opportunistic’, the applicants felt Adani’s
conduct undermined their authority and exacerbated divisions within the
Wangan and Jagalingou community (Adani Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others,
2013). It was also stated that the WJ Corporation represented people who
were not registered claimants and some members were seeking to unseat the
applicants. These concerns were expressed in several letters to Adani sent in
mid-November 2012. Despite this, the authorisation meeting was not
cancelled and a resolution was passed on the day. However, the resolution
rejected the ILUA on offer and recommended additional terms to be included
in the agreement (Adani Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013).
Adani continued to communicate directly with the WJ Corporation while it
was aware of a dispute between the applicants and the WJ Corporation board
members. The applicants are entrusted with the responsibility to represent
the interests of the claim group during negotiations (Duff, 2017; NNTT, 2017).
While Adani’s actions were not considered illegal, its decision to suspend
negotiations with the applicants and seek authorisation from a group it
deemed as equally representative of the claim group undermined the role of
the applicants (Adani Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013).
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While some registered claimants would have attended the 1 December 2012
meeting, and the applicant Patrick Malone moved the motion to adopt the
resolution on the day, the conduct of Adani highlights its unwillingness to
compromise on its final settlement deal (Adani Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others,
2013). Adani placed the applicants in a challenging position, whereby an
unauthorised representative body was delegated influence during a pivotal
stage of negotiations. This occurred without the support of the applicants. It
appears that Adani’s decision to give power to a third party was done with the
intention that the meeting attendees would settle for the ILUA on offer.

An Unsatisfactory Agreement
Both Adani and the Wangan and Jagalingou applicants present a number of
conflicting claims about the circumstances that led to the collapse of
negotiations. It is unclear whether disagreements can be ascribed to
miscommunication or deliberate misinformation. However, what becomes
clear is that the applicants were not satisfied with the terms of agreement. The
applicants stated in a letter to Adani that without a life of mine services
contract the compensation aspect of the ILUA would be “wholly deficient”
(Adani Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013, p. 89). In a letter sent in midOctober to Adani, the applicants contended that, “the compensation put
forward in Adani’s offer of 24 September 2012 for a mine of this scale and
impact would otherwise be seriously inadequate” (Adani Mining v. Jessie Diver
& Others, 2013, p. 73). The life of mine services contract was proposed in the
letter and indicated that with the contract ensured, the ILUA would be
acceptable. However, Adani was unwilling to negotiate a services contract
with the applicants and sought authorisation elsewhere before turning to the
State for approval.
In the process of negotiating agreements with government and developers,
Indigenous communities wish to attain a ‘better life’ in both an economic and
cultural sense (O’Faircheallaigh, 2006). Some future acts can produce shortand long-term opportunities for locals and some Indigenous people strongly
support mining developments (Behrendt & Strelein, 2001; O’Faircheallaigh,
2006). However, the cumulative effects caused by mining can be damaging to
land and culture. Many native title groups attempt to strike a balance between
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the material and cultural benefits of development projects. While financial
gain may be beneficial for under-resourced communities, it may not be the
goal that agreements are signed at the detriment of connection to country and
culture (O’Faircheallaigh, 2006). The terms of agreement must therefore
contain adequate benefits to justify the impact of developments on traditional
land.
In this case, the applicants were dissatisfied with the ILUA put forward and
required more time to negotiate a stronger agreement. However, they were
unable to strike a deal they felt compensated for the surrender of native title.
Adani, unwilling to extend their timeframe, opted to have the State grant their
mining lease without Indigenous consent.

An Emerging Pattern
The first phase of negotiations reflect the complexities observed in similar
case studies. The Carmichael Coal Mine is a large-scale development that has
placed Australia’s native title system under scrutiny and tested its capacity to
protect Indigenous rights and interests. Large resource projects often become
problematic when they encounter native title for a number of reasons.
When the Wangan and Jagalingou people refused to sign a deal with Adani, the
company ensured that the failure to obtain consent did not cause further delay
and approached the NNTT. The involvement of the State had desirable
outcomes for Adani. As its schedule began to elapse, Adani threatened to
arbitrate the matter if the agreement was not signed. In a letter to the
applicants a few days before the deadline, Adani indicated it would file a
future act determination application with the NNTT if the applicants’ change
of lawyers were to delay its schedule. The letter exchanged between the legal
representatives of Adani and the Wangan and Jagalingou applicants stated, “If
the ILUA were to be authorised on 1 December 2012, the grantee party would
consider discontinuing its future act determination application” (Adani Mining
v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013, p. 22). This communication put the applicants
under pressure to accept the agreement or have the State Government
compulsorily acquire their land. The literature has observed that the State
consistently rules in favour of mining interests (O’Faircheallaigh, 2006; Ritter,
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2009; Scambary, 2013). This is reflected in the NNTT’s decision to approve the
Carmichael Coal Mine when Adani sought a future act determination.
The Federal Government has increasingly tasked developers with the role of
funding negotiations (Burnside, 2008; O’Faircheallaigh, 2006; Scambary,
2013; Ritter, 2009). This presents a conflict of interest for resource
companies, as it reduces the impartiality of the future act process and can
undermine the bargaining position of Indigenous groups (Scambary, 2013;
Ritter, 2009). The heads of development projects control the funds distributed
in the course of negotiations and can refuse to provide certain advisors or
even choose to suspend funding. The role can be used strategically to pressure
Indigenous groups into accepting weak agreements (O’Faircheallaigh, 2006;
Scambary, 2013).
Adani met the costs of negotiations with the Wangan and Jagalingou people.
Funding primarily included travel costs for meetings and paid legal advice
(Adani Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013; Adani Mining v. Adrian
Burragubba & Others, 2015). In the first phase of negotiations, Adani
threatened to deny the applicants funding for new legal advisors. Adani
expressed discontent over the applicants’ decision to change lawyers in
September 2012 and stated that it was “unlikely to agree to extra costs of
funding legal representation” (Adani Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013, p.
55). The company subsequently agreed to fund meetings between the
applicants and their new lawyers on the condition that an agreement would
be reached by the devised deadline. This reflects the conduct of developers
observed in the literature, whereby control over funds leads to the tendency
to set conditions and withhold funding if an Indigenous group seeks to extend
or alter negotiations (O’Faircheallaigh, 2006; Scambary, 2013)
While Adani denied that it exacerbated divisions by involving the WJ
Corporation in negotiations, the applicants remained adamant that it would
perpetuate conflict within the Wangan and Jagalingou community (Adani
Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013). Adani’s collaboration with a separate
representative body effectively took power and authority away from the
individuals voted in to speak on behalf on the claim group. While the company
acknowledged its awareness of division in the community, it still acted to
further its own interests.
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It is clear from the first phase of negotiations that while Indigenous rights
exist, they can be undermined when required to compete with the power of
mining interests. When collective rights, such as the right to negotiate (RTN),
fail to produce desirable outcomes for mining interests, the overriding powers
of government are sought to remedy obstacles to development. As outlined in
the theories of Kymlicka and Buchanan, the rights afforded under the NTA
have fulfilled the mandate of collective rights. However, examining the
tangible outcomes of these rights exposes the severe limitations of the
process. Critical race theory (CRT) would postulate that the dominance of
‘white’ interests, which prioritise mining interests in the Australian context,
undermines Indigenous land rights.
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Chapter 4
The First Determination
Adani has sought a future act determination on two occasions. The company
approached the National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT) to have its three mining
leases approved, but not to arbitrate an Indigenous Land Use Agreement
(ILUA). Thus, negotiations continued between Adani and the Wangan and
Jagalingou applicants despite two determination outcomes that ruled in
favour of the Carmichael Coal Mine. The first future act determination in May
2013 concerned one initial mining lease, and the second determination in
April 2015 concerned two further mining leases. This chapter will focus on the
May 2013 determination and the division within the claim group that
occurred thereafter.
When the first phase of negotiations had exceeded Adani’s deadline with no
agreement outcome, the company filed a future act determination application
with the NNTT on 7 November 2012. Seven months later, on 7 May 2013, the
NNTT delivered its determination in favour of the mining lease (ML) 70441.
The decision gave the State Government a green flag to approve the tenement
required to commence development for the Carmichael Coal Mine. Adani and
the State Government sought a ruling that the future act may be done without
conditions. It appears that both parties acted in tandem, routinely echoing the
same perspectives in their submissions to the NNTT. The NNTT ruled that the
mining lease could be granted on the basis of public interest.
The Native Title Act (NTA) permits any party to seek arbitration if
negotiations exceed six months without a settlement reached. Any party may
file a future act determination application at the NNTT (NNTT, 2008a, 2016;
NTSCORP, 2017). In making a future act determination, the NNTT must
interpret sections of the NTA to determine whether a future act may or may
not be done (O’Faircheallaigh, 2006; Ritter, 2009). The process involves three
parties: the native title applicants, the State Government, and the grantee
party. All parties are asked to make submissions of any contentions or
evidence to the NNTT to assist its determination. If the NNTT rules in favour of
the proposed future act, the government has permission to grant tenement in
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the absence of an agreement reached between the grantee and the traditional
owners (NNTT, 2008a).
In its May 2013 determination, the NNTT concluded that the applicants did
not submit sufficient evidence to demonstrate the exercise or enjoyment of
their rights and interests in the claim area (Adani Mining v. Jessie Diver &
Others, 2013). The NNTT ruled that the applicants’ submissions provided
broad assertions of an impact on their rights and interests but offered no
specific evidence about how these rights and interests were exercised or
enjoyed. The State Government and Adani both claimed that the Carmichael
Coal Mine would be unlikely to affect the native title group’s enjoyment of
their rights and interests. The State Government and Adani repeatedly
emphasised the economic benefits of the Carmichael Project for the local
community, the State of Queensland and the wider national economy (Adani
Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013).
The applicants requested that conditions be attached to the mining lease
should the NNTT determine that the future act may be done. The NNTT
dismissed the recommended conditions and handed down its determination
on 7 May 2013, ruling that the State Government may grant ML 70441 without
conditions (Adani Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013).
The State Government and Adani’s response has been based on their views
expressed in the NNTT’s determination. However, it must be appreciated that
the full submissions to the NNTT are not publicly available. The evidence
relies on the NNTT’s interpretation of those submissions. Nevertheless, the
State Government and Adani reflected similar positions, emphasising the same
benefits of the project and arguing that the rights and interests of the
applicants would not be affected. These views persist despite the applicants’
claim that there would be a significant impact on the enjoyment of their rights
and interests as a consequence of the development (Adani Mining v. Jessie
Diver & Others, 2013).
While there was no media commentary or parliamentary debate on the
outcome of the May 2013 determination, a significant event occurred at the
peak of negotiations. This event demonstrated the close relations of the State
Government and Adani. In late November 2012, the then Queensland Premier,
Campbell Newman, led a seven-day trade mission to India to discuss
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investment and exporting prospects for Queensland’s industries (Hodge,
2012; Queensland Government, 2012; Readfearn, 2015). Newman highlighted
that the overseas mission would, “include meetings with companies such as
Adani Group, GVK and Tata Group – companies with diversified interests and
investments across a range of key industry sectors” (Queensland Parliament.
Record of Proceedings, November 9, 2012, p. 2955).
Newman, former Minister for Resources and Energy Martin Ferguson and a
76-person cohort of Queensland businessmen flew to the Adani-owned
Mundra Port on a private Adani jet. In the evening, they attended a reception
at the private estate of Gautam Adani in Ahmedabad (Hodge, 2012; Readfearn,
2015). In a report on the trade mission tabled to the Queensland Parliament,
Newman reiterated his support for Adani: “I acknowledge the large
investment made by the Adani Group into Queensland’s resources sectors and
indicated commitment to working with the Adani Group to ensure their
investment in Queensland is supported” (Newman, 2013, p. 29).
During the trade mission the Queensland Government made a clear
commitment to support Adani, while in the same month the company had
acted to sidestep the traditional owners of the Galilee Basin. The response of
the State Government and Adani before the NNTT reflect a cohesive and
shared ambition to ensure the Carmichael Project proceeded. The State
Government appeared unaware or unsupportive of the concerns raised by the
native title group.

The Split in the Community
The second phase of negotiations commenced in October 2013 and ended in
October 2014. As negotiations failed to produce an agreement between Adani
and the Wangan and Jagalingou people after 12 months, Adani approached the
State to arbitrate the matter for a second time. In this respect, the second
phase of negotiations had similar results to the first. However, during this
period the Wangan and Jagalingou community became deeply divided and
split into two factions. One supported the Carmichael Coal Mine if the
agreement was sensitive to Indigenous interests, whereas the other was
opposed to the project and any deal offered. While the native title system
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disenfranchised the interests of the latter group, the former still had the
capacity to strike a strong bargaining position and negotiate a mutually
beneficial agreement. There is evidence to indicate that internal division
contributed to the unresolved outcome of the second phase of negotiations.
This analysis largely relies on the determinations of the NNTT and its account
of events and correspondence relevant to its decisions. The second half of this
chapter analyses the evidence provided in Adani Mining v. Adrian Burragubba
& Others (2015), a 46-page legal document. When the second phase of
negotiations ended in October 2014, Adani filed a future act determination
application with the NNTT. In this determination, the applicants chose not to
make a submission. In the absence of any materials or contentions submitted
to the NNTT on behalf of the native title group, it is difficult to determine the
factors that led to the collapse of negotiations in this second phase. In contrast
to the previous future act determination wherein the applicants detailed their
experience during the first phase of negotiations, the second phase lacks the
evidence to form a chronological account of what occurred. As the NNTT
asserted in relation to the second phase: “Within the evidence there is minimal
information about ILUA negotiations” (Adani Mining v. Adrian Burragubba &
Others, 2015, p. 45).
While there is less evidence available to detail the second phase of
negotiations, it is clear that the Wangan and Jagalingou people were
dissatisfied with the terms of agreement. At a claim group meeting in October
2014, the proposed ILUA was rejected by majority vote. This marked the
second agreement to be refused and Adani immediately sought arbitration to
have ML 70505 and ML 70506 approved without Indigenous consent (Adani
Mining v. Adrian Burragubba & Others, 2015).

A Change of Representation
While the Wangan and Jagalingou people appeared to resemble a united bloc
during the first phase negotiations, a clear division emerged in the course of
the second phase. On 7 August 2014, the seven persons registered as the
native title applicants for the claim group were replaced with three applicants,
two of whom were existing applicants. Five applicants were not re-appointed
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(Adani Mining v. Adrian Burragubba & Others, 2015). While Patrick Malone
and Irene White had been representatives for the group since the beginning of
negotiations, Adrian Burragubba was appointed as a new applicant. It appears
a distinct division of opinion within the Wangan and Jagalingou people
coincided with the change of representatives.
The dominant perspective of the claim group in the first phase of negotiations
was a willingness to accept the Carmichael Project and surrender native title if
a satisfactory agreement could be reached. However, a separate faction
emerged with the appointment of Adrian Burragubba in August 2014. This
‘breakaway’ group was unwilling to give consent to the project regardless of
the conditions, compensation or benefits included in the ILUA. Adrian
Burragubba, as a new applicant and founder of the Wangan and Jagalingou
Family Council (WJ Family Council), represented the views of the latter
faction.
The WJ Family Council is a community group that claims to represent the
interests of the Wangan and Jagalingou people (Hunjan, 2015; Yoon, 2015). It
has been described as an anti-mine group that seeks to conserve and protect
the land of the traditional owners in central Queensland (Ker, 2016). The WJ
Family Council remains adamant that the Wangan and Jagalingou people do
not want the Carmichael Coal Mine to proceed on any terms. In a media
release, Adrian Burragubba stated the position of the WJ Family Council:
A pittance from compensation agreements signed under duress, and a
few minimum-wage jobs in a dying industry, are not what our people,
especially our young people, deserve. The crumbs thrown by Adani are
not worth sacrificing our dignity, our freedom and our ancient legacy
for. Nothing Adani offers up will ever be worth the damage this mine
will inflict on laws and customs. (WJ Family Council, 2016d, para. 14)
In contrast to the anti-mine rhetoric of Adrian Burragubba and his cohort, the
views of the other applicants, Patrick Malone and Irene White, remained
consistent with the stance adopted during the first phase of negotiations. This
position accepted the establishment of the mine on Wangan and Jagalingou
land but aimed to negotiate terms of agreement that would return long-term
intergenerational benefits to the community. Aligned with the perspective that
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they were working towards an agreement with Adani, these applicants chose
to withhold consent until the ILUA offered satisfactory benefits.
Patrick Malone and Irene White do not appear to be associated with any
Wangan and Jagalingou organisation in particular, but instead represent the
interests of the claim group independently. They are not board members of
the WJ Council nor is there any evidence of their involvement at the WJ
Corporation. In consideration of the dispute between the applicants and the
WJ Corporation in the first phase of negotiations, it can be assumed that the
applicants continue to operate independently of the WJ Corporation and any
other WJ-affiliated organisations.
It is common for members of Indigenous groups to share different views on
commercial development and cultural heritage. While some may consider the
opportunity for local jobs and business ownership as paramount, others may
consider the conservation of traditional lands and sacred sites to be more
important (O’Faircheallaigh, 2007). The divide that emerged in the second
phase of negotiations may reflect the different values each individual claimant
has attached to economic growth and culture heritage. The faction that
accepted the development of the mine was willing to surrender part of their
ancestral lands in exchange for long-term economic benefits for the
community. The anti-mine faction, however, considered the protection of
traditional land and culture more important than any compensation offered.
The discourse of the anti-mine faction emphasised the imminent threat of the
development to the culture of the Wangan and Jagalingou people. In October
2015, WJ Family Council members Adrian Burragubba and Murrawah Johnson
made a submission to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples in a plea to have their concerns recognised. The
submission described the intrinsic link between land and culture for the
Wangan and Jagalingou people:
Our land and waters are our culture, and our special relationship with
them tells us who we are. Our culture is inseparable from the
condition of our traditional lands… The development of the
Carmichael Mine would tear the heart out of our country, rendering
our land unrecognisable, and devastating the places, animals, plants
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and water-bodies that are so essential to us and our culture.
(Burragubba & Johnson, 2015, p. 2)

A Rift Between the Applicants
The divided opinion between the applicants became evident in their conduct
before the NNTT. This occurred after the second phase of negotiations had
elapsed without an outcome. In January 2015, the NNTT was informed that
the applicants would not be submitting any material or contentions to support
their case (Adani Mining v. Adrian Burragubba & Others, 2015). However,
several days following the deadline for submissions, Adrian Burragubba sent
an unsigned statement written on behalf of the WJ Family Council. The
statement addressed concerns in relation to the impact of the Carmichael Coal
Mine on the traditional land and cultural heritage of the Wangan and
Jagalingou people (Adani Mining v. Adrian Burragubba & Others, 2015). Adrian
Burragubba alleged that the applicants’ views were not unanimous and that
Patrick Malone and Irene White had taken a ‘contrary direction’ to the
interests of the claim group. When the NNTT asked if his statement should be
taken into account, the applicants, Adani, and the State Government all agreed
that it should not be considered (Adani Mining v. Adrian Burragubba & Others,
2015; Kos, 2016).
Adrian Burragubba’s submission to the NNTT has not been made publicly
available and has been broadly summarised in its determination. The
summary noted that his submission detailed the reasons the applicants could
not participate in the proceedings (Adani Mining v. Adrian Burragubba &
Others, 2015). In its determination, the NNTT did provide the full version of a
second statement made by Adrian Burragubba. This second statement
clarified his argument and reinforced that the Wangan and Jagalingou people
do not consent to the Carmichael Coal Mine (Adani Mining v. Adrian
Burragubba & Others, 2015).
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A Sense of Practicality or Obligation
While Adrian Burragubba and his supporters were dedicated to opposing the
Carmichael Coal Mine regardless of the deal offered, the applicants and
claimants that reflected a willingness to accommodate the project may have
formed their perspective with awareness to the limitations of native title. At
best, when an Indigenous group refuses to give consent, the company’s social
license to operate may be blemished in the eyes of investors (O’Faircheallaigh,
2011; Robertson, 2016b; Scambary, 2013). The Wangan and Jagalingou
claimants who do not support the Carmichael Project on any terms are left
without a legislative foothold. The State had continued to issue approvals
despite the failure to obtain consent up until that point.
Patrick Malone and Irene White may have acted out of practicality, as they
understand the existing legislation does not enable them to prevent the mine
but that the community could attain benefits if a strong agreement was
reached. In a news article, Patrick Malone stated that, “even though some
[Wangan and Jagalingou] people didn’t like the idea of the mine, most knew it
would probably go ahead and it was best to take the opportunities for our
people, to get jobs for the next generations” (McKenna, 2015). This statement
acknowledged the perspective shared among claimants who recognise the
limitations of the native title system and the inevitability of mining expansion.
Patrick Malone and Irene White have spoken favourably about signing an
agreement with Adani on the basis that it delivers long-term intergenerational
opportunities that will flow back to the Wangan and Jagalingou community
(Branco, 2015a; McKenna, 2015). However, there have been several occasions
where the media has reported divergent views. While Irene White has
remained a proponent of the Carmichael Coal Mine, Patrick Malone has
expressed a reluctance to accept the mine. The three applicants appointed in
the second phase of negotiations reflected far greater inconsistency in their
sentiments towards the development compared to those in the first
appointment. At one end of the spectrum, Irene White remained pro-mine
while Patrick Malone was initially conflicted and then accepted the
inevitability of the mine. At the other end, Adrian Burragubba was strongly
anti-mine. Irene White expressed her views on the Carmichael Coal Mine to
The Australian on 3 December 2015, arguing that “The decision is about
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working with Adani to create jobs, create training so that we can build a
platform for our younger generation” and that the agreement would “deliver
genuine and lasting intergenerational benefits to our community“ (McKenna,
2015). Patrick Malone has spoken both for and against the mine. While he has
admitted that he would “prefer the mine to not go ahead”, he has also told
media he had accepted that the project would be approved and he was
committed to achieving the best deal for his community (Branco, 2015, para.
8).
The corporate funding of negotiations may be a factor that has caused those
applicants engaged in negotiations for a longer period to feel more obligated
to match the expectations of Adani. Responsible for funding negotiations,
Adani has paid the travel costs of the applicants for meetings and lobbied
some of the applicants through the payment of generous ‘sitting fees’. Sitting
fees have been paid to a number of the applicants. On 21 August 2015, nine
new applicants were appointed and Patrick Malone, Irene White and Adrian
Burragubba were re-appointed (Adani Mining v. Adrian Burragubba & Others,
2015).
According to The Guardian, Adani paid seven of the 12 applicants, including
Patrick Malone and Irene White, over $10,500 collectively in excess of travel
expenses to attend meetings (Robertson, 2016, 2016b; WJ Family Council,
2016). The seven applicants that received sitting fees were proponents of the
Carmichael Project. The five other applicants were opposed to the
development and refused to accept payments (Robertson, 2016b). For some
applicants who may have had more accommodating views towards the mine,
receiving payments to attend meetings may have conjured a sense of
obligation. The literature strongly supports the argument that the developer’s
responsibility to fund negotiations creates an uneven power dynamic that can
considerably influence agreement outcomes (Burnside, 2008;
O’Faircheallaigh, 2006; Scambary, 2013; Ritter, 2009).
It appears that the rise of an anti-mine faction within the claim group
thwarted the outcome of negotiations in the second phase. Patrick Malone and
Irene White explained to the media that Adani had improved the terms of
agreement and the revised ILUA had gained widespread support. However,
there was a shift following the appointment of Adrian Burragubba and
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support for the offer diminished. When the group met to consider the
agreement in October 2014, the growing anti-mine sentiments caused it to be
voted down (McKenna, 2015). It is likely that divided opinion during the
second phase of negotiations contributed to the unresolved outcome.
Following the second rejection of the ILUA, Adani ended negotiations and
lodged a future act determination application with the NNTT on 10 October
2014 (Adani Mining v. Adrian Burragubba & Others, 2015).
It is clear that the process of negotiation and the limitations of the NTA left the
Indigenous community vulnerable to fracturing and division, further
undermining their interests. When the right to negotiate (RTN) fails to operate
as intended and traditional owners refuse to consent to a development, these
rights can effectively be nullified through the right of all parties to arbitrate
the matter. This chapter has examined the avenue of arbitration, whereby
Adani has sought the overarching powers of the State to advance approvals in
the absence of Indigenous consent. The strength of the RTN is subject to the
decisions of mining interests and the State who may seek to override the
interests of traditional owners. If an agreement fails actualise, the RTN
becomes a redundant right.
The outcome of this process demonstrates that the NTA does not allow
traditional owners to fully assert collective rights, as conceptualised in the
theories of Kymlicka and Buchanan. The weaknesses of the rights afforded by
native title reflect the arguments inherent in critical race theory (CRT). CRT
would argue that the apparatus of native title law has ensured that it offers
almost no legislative foothold for Indigenous groups who oppose ‘white’
interests in resource development. Thus, the dominant interests of ‘whites’
will always supersede the rights and interests of native title groups.
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Chapter 5
Back to the Tribunal
When the second phase of negotiations failed to produce an Indigenous Land
Use Agreement (ILUA), Adani sought arbitration for two further mining leases.
If the National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT) ruled that the future act may be
done, the government would be able to grant the mining leases in the absence
of an ILUA signed with the Wangan and Jagalingou people. Adani filed its
second future act determination for the additional mining leases (ML) 70505
and 70506 in October 2014. The NNTT delivered its determination in favour
of the Carmichael Coal Mine on 8 April 2015 (Adani Mining v. Adrian
Burragubba & Others, 2015).
As examined in the previous chapter, the native title applicants chose not to
make a submission to the NNTT for this determination with the exception of
Adrian Burragubba’s two statements (Adani Mining v. Adrian Burragubba &
Others, 2015). In consideration of his statements, the State Government and
the NNTT both raised concerns about its ‘authenticity’ and ‘authority’. A few
days before the determination, the NNTT received a letter confirming Adrian
Burragubba as an authorised representative of the WJ Family Council.
However, his statements were still dismissed on the basis that they failed “in
terms of authority” (Adani Mining v. Adrian Burragubba & Others, 2015). The
NNTT reasoned that since his submission did not receive any support from the
other applicants, it should not be taken into consideration as evidence.
Consistent with their submission in the May 2013 determination, the State
Government and Adani both reflect similar views and sought a determination
that would impose no conditions on the two mining leases (Adani Mining v.
Adrian Burragubba & Others, 2015). Both parties contended that the grant of
mining leases in the area was unlikely to have a significant effect on the native
title group’s enjoyment of their rights and interests. However, it was admitted
that they were unaware of whether the claim group exercised their rights and
interests in the proposed area. In response to the listed criterion of the NTA,
the State Government and Adani claimed that they were unaware of any likely
effect on the claim group’s way of life, culture and traditions; development of
social, cultural and economic structures; freedom of access and freedom to
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carry out rites and ceremonies; or effect on the areas or sites of particular
significance (Adani Mining v. Adrian Burragubba & Others, 2015).
The State Government attributed the failure of negotiations to the division
between the applicants. In its submission to the NNTT, it argued, “the Native
Title Party [the applicants] and Grantee Party were close to authorising an
Indigenous Land Use Agreement (ILUA)… but that issues arose within the
Native Title Party at the time of authorisation of the proposed ILUA” (Adani
Mining v. Adrian Burragubba & Others, 2015, p. 38). Consistent with the views
expressed in the May 2013 determination, the State Government and Adani
highlighted the economic significance of the Carmichael Project for local
communities, the State of Queensland and wider Australia.
The State Government and Adani both claimed that the Carmichael Coal Mine
was in the public interest. The State Government emphasised the importance
of the mining sector within the national economy, asserting that, “the grant of
exploration permits is central to the maintenance of a healthy and feasible
mining industry in Queensland… [and] the mining industry plays a pivotal role
in maintaining Australia’s economic strength” (Adani Mining v. Adrian
Burragubba & Others, 2015, p. 43). In the absence of any material submitted
that challenged the views of the mine’s proponents, the NNTT delivered
another ruling in favour of Adani and attached no conditions to its mining
leases.

Response to the Media
Following the April 2015 determination, Patrick Malone revealed to the media
that the applicants’ decision not to make a submission to the NNTT was
because it could compromise the pending recognition of the Wangan and
Jagalingou native title claim (Branco, 2015a). While Patrick Malone remained
aligned with the pro-mine cohort during negotiations, at times he has
expressed criticisms of the native title system and the Carmichael Project in
his statements to the media. He has spoken of the inherent bias in the future
act process and contended that the NNTT is unfairly skewed towards the
interests of mining companies and the government. Having an awareness of
the NNTT’s tendency to rule in the favour of the proponents, he felt his people
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were unlikely to have a successful outcome in the determination (Branco,
2015a). He contended, “We’re looking at an end game here and the end game
is to make sure that we get our native title determination… If we'd have gone
into this thing where we're going to lose they would have used that against us
having our native title rights recognised” (Branco, 2015, para. 10). It appears
that the applicants’ anticipation of an unsuccessful outcome before the NNTT
has triggered concerns that it could stand in the way of their wider interests.
Adani’s response in the media following the NNTT’s second determination
demonstrated its reluctance to acknowledge members of the claim group who
were opposed to the Carmichael Project. The company remained adamant that
the Wangan and Jagalingou people supported the mine and that it was
negotiating with those ‘authorised’ to represent the group (Branco, 2015;
Borschmann, 2015; “Qld: Traditional owners,” 2015). In statements to the
media, Adani claimed that Adrian Burragubba was unauthorised to speak on
behalf of the claim group (“Qld: Traditional owners,” 2015; Borschmann,
2015; Branco, 2015; Frost, 2015). In March 2015, an Adani spokesperson told
ABC News, “Adani continues to negotiate with the W&J authorised [emphasis
added] representatives… Adani does not believe that the W&J don’t want this
mine” (Borschmann, 2015, para. 20-21). The allegations against Adrian
Burragubba occurred when the NNTT was taking submissions and continued
for months after the determination was handed down in April 2015.
Adani’s attempt to suppress the views of Adrian Burragubba through
challenging his authority undermines the legitimacy of the native title system.
While he had been formally appointed to represent the views of the Wangan
and Jagalingou people, Adani continued to dismiss his authority to speak on
their behalf and chose to liaise with the applicants who were more
accommodating of its project (Burragubba & Johnson, 2015). In its submission
to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the WJ
Family Council alleged that, “[Adani’s] actions include undermining and
challenging the right of our authorised senior spokesperson [Adrian
Burragubba] to speak and be consulted” (Burragubba & Johnson, 2015, p. 2).
The submission also addressed Adani’s efforts to use division to advance their
interests:
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the company attempted to use a divide-and-conquer tactic by
excluding our senior authorised spokesperson, Adrian Burragubba,
who was at the time one of the three people comprising the Applicant
on the native title claim, from meetings at which Adani Mining
attempted to secure agreements with the two other Applicant group
members… the company has falsely stated that it was “dealing with all
duly authorised representatives” of the Wangan and Jagalingou people
when it was dealing only with the two members of the former
Applicant group who did not represent the wishes of our people.
(Burragubba & Johnson, 2015, p. 18)
While Adrian Burragubba had expressed views that stood in isolation to the
views of Patrick Malone and Irene White, his opposition to the Carmichael
Project was shared with a section of the Wangan and Jagalingou community.
Patrick Malone responded to Adani’s allegations and told media that Adrian
Burragubba “had as much right to speak as himself or Ms White” (Branco,
2015, para. 17). Thus, despite the divided opinion between the applicants in
the months preceding and following the April 2015 determination, this
statement confirms that at least one of the applicants supported Adrian
Burragubba as an authorised representative and, unlike Adani, did not dispute
his authority to speak on behalf of the claim group.
The literature revealed that mining companies and governments are quick to
identify and capitalise on any disunity or division within native title groups
(O’Faircheallaigh, 2007; Marsh, 2013). Internal conflict will often be exploited
to benefit vested interests and where division has been identified, weaker
agreement outcomes have followed for Indigenous groups (O’Faircheallaigh,
2007).
In the days following the NNTT’s April 2015 determination, Adani made
statements to the media that highlighted the division it had identified between
the native title applicants (Branco, 2015). An Adani spokesperson told The
Brisbane Times, “Adani is aware of at least one instance where the authorised
majority of the W&J applicant instructed that the NNTT should disregard an
individual statement of one of its group” (Branco, 2015, para. 11). Along with
identifying disunity, Adani made public statements to undermine the
authority of the applicant who was least supportive of its project. This
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response could be viewed as an attempt to stifle emerging views within the
claim group that could delay or thwart negotiations.

Parliamentary Oversight
The State Government’s response to the two determinations of the NNTT is
consistent with the discourse of representatives in State Parliament. During
parliamentary debates in 2014 and 2015, members have expressed their
support for the Carmichael Project and stressed the importance of the
resources sector to Queensland.
In May 2014, the former Premier Campbell Newman declared, “we are
particularly excited to see the Adani Carmichael project get going”
(Queensland Parliament. Record of Proceedings, May 21, 2014, p. 1662). In
May 2015, the Minister for State Development and Natural Resources and
Mines, Anthony Lynham, stated, “There is no doubt that the resources sector
drives the Queensland economy… A jobs focused government is a government
that is pro the resources sector… We are working with Adani and have
demonstrated our support for the project” (Queensland Parliament. Record of
Proceedings, May 7, 2015, p. 560). This statement, reflective of the State
Government’s submissions to the NNTT, emphasises the prioritisation of
mining as a key component of the State’s economy.
The statements of ministers to the media reflect the State Government’s
support of Adani. In March 2015, Anthony Lynham described the Carmichael
Coal Mine as a ‘vital’ project for Queensland (“Adani, GVK win Queensland,”
2015). In June 2015, Queensland Labor Treasurer Curtis Pitt told Fairfax
Media, “we welcome Adani’s significant investment proposal in Queensland
with the Carmichael Coal Project and enabling infrastructure” (Cox, 2015a,
para. 4). The Queensland Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk told ABC News in
October 2015, “my Government will continue to work with the company
[Adani] about how we can deliver the projects that are needed here in this
state” (Hatzakis, 2015, para. 10). The response of the State Government in
parliament demonstrates its overwhelming support for mining developments.
This view is consistent with the widespread perception of mining exploration
as an integral national interest.
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The rights and interests of the Wangan and Jagalingou people are seldom
mentioned in parliamentary debate. Despite discussion of the Carmichael
Project in State Parliament, the oversight of Indigenous concerns has been
largely absent when the topic is raised. In May 2016, Anthony Lynham boasted
the ‘positive progress’ made between Adani and the traditional owners with
the settlement of an ILUA, declaring that this was a significant milestone for
the advancement of the project (Queensland Parliament. Record of
Proceedings, May 11, 2016, p. 1670). The State Parliament has made reference
to the Wangan and Jagalingou people once more, again to praise desirable
developments in negotiations.
The interests of the claim group have been discussed briefly in Federal
Parliament in the context of contentious environmental legislation. In
response to the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation
Amendment (Standing) Bill, introduced in August 2015, Labor Member
Melissa Parke acknowledged that the impacts of the Carmichael Coal Mine
were of concern to the traditional owners in the region. She made reference to
Adrian Burragubba as a representative of the Wangan and Jagalingou cohort
opposed to the mine, and highlighted that the proposed legislation would
unfairly restrict the group’s ability to challenge similar developments in the
courts (Parliament of Australia. Record of Proceedings, September 9, 2015, p.
9595).
While the concerns of environmental groups have been debated at length in
Federal Parliament, its members have failed to acknowledge the interests of
the Wangan and Jagalingou people. While the media has captured the views of
various representatives of the Wangan and Jagalingou community, there
appears to be little parliamentary oversight to consider the interests of this
group during the phases of approval. The Wangan and Jagalingou people have
a significant stake in the outcome of this process, as they possess rights to the
land. Despite this, parliamentary discussion has mainly focussed on
environmental opponents to the Carmichael Project and ignored the concerns
of Indigenous rights-holders that also stand in opposition to the development.
As Wellington (2016) contends, “Indigenous opposition to the Carmichael
mine has been largely whited out of the story… By ignoring them, government
and media fail to acknowledge the Indigenous rights-based challenge to the
Carmichael mine” (para. 17-18). In the process of granting multiple approvals
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to Adani, almost no dialogue entered Federal or State Parliament in relation to
Indigenous rights and interests.
Parliament has failed to give recognition to the anti-mine cohort. It is unclear
whether this is due to the government’s vested interest in coal mining and the
investment of Adani in central Queensland, or whether members of
parliament believe that the native title process is a fair and just system that
produces legitimate results.

A Disputed Agreement
While the second rejection of the ILUA in October 2014 was a clear and
unanimous decision, the vote for Adani’s third settlement deal has been
disputed. The WJ Family Council convened an authorisation meeting in March
2016 with the Wangan and Jagalingou people where the ILUA was voted down
for a third time (WJ Family Council, 2016a). However, Adani convened a
meeting with the claim group the following month on 16 April 2016 where the
attendees voted in favour of the agreement (“Adani mine,” 2016). While the
WJ Family Council have labelled this meeting a ‘sham’ and deemed the vote
unauthorised and illegitimate, the State Government has openly supported the
outcome of the Adani-convened meeting.
Representatives of the WJ Family Council have contended that many claimants
present at the March 2016 meeting had chosen to boycott the meeting
organised by Adani the following month (WJ Family Council, 2016c). As many
members of the claim group did not attend the Adani-convened meeting in
April, the vote to endorse the settlement deal was unrepresentative of the
Wangan and Jagalingou people as a whole (WJ Family Council, 2016c). It has
been alleged that over half the voters were not members of claim group
(Robertson, 2017). This has raised issues of validation, as the WJ Family
Council claimed that more than 200 of the 340 voters were not direct
descendants of the 12 families who comprise the claim group. Adani
engineered the meeting outcome and spent over half a million dollars to ‘renta-crowd’ (WJ Family Council, 2017). WJ Family Council representative
Murrawah Johnson expressed in a statement that “Adani has bussed in large
numbers of people, including non-members of our claim group who have no
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connection to the country… Many members of the claim group who last met in
March refused to attend Adani’s meeting today” (WJ Family Council, 2016c,
para. 8). Adani rejected these allegations and maintained that the meeting was
consistent with the required statutory process (“Adani mine,” 2016).
The ILUA authorised in April 2016 included an upfront payment of $550,000
to the Wangan and Jagalingou people and an Indigenous Participation Plan
that would distribute approximately $5,000 annually to each person living in
the region (Wellington, 2016). The anti-mine Wangan and Jagalingou faction
have claimed that the ILUA endorsed in April 2016 was a weaker deal than the
previous terms of agreement on offer. The windfall amount of half a million
was considerably less than the figure included in the settlement deal offered in
2014, alleged to be $1.5 million (McKenna, 2015a; Robertson, 2017). If these
statements are accurate, it may be the case that the claimants willing to
accommodate the mine have been unable to negotiate a satisfactory
agreement and have settled for a weaker deal under pressure from Adani.
However, if indeed the majority of the attendees at the April 2016 meeting
were not part of the claim group as it has been alleged, then Adani has
engineered a partial agreement. This was the second time Adani has acted to
force an outcome. An unsuccessful attempt was made at the end of 2012 when
it convened a meeting in concert with the WJ Corporation, sidelining the
registered applicants.
Despite the WJ Family Council’s condemnation of the authorisation meeting in
April, the Australian Government has left the legitimacy of the standing ILUA
unquestioned. Instead, the Federal and State Government have welcomed the
decision and remained silent on the contentiousness of the matter.

The McGlade decision: A new hope or more uncertainty?
The Commonwealth has scrambled to amend the NTA in response to a recent
Federal Court determination that invalidated countless ILUAs (Borrello, 2017;
Connors, 2017; McKenna, 2017; Sferruzzi, 2017). In February 2016, a
landmark Western Australian court action known as the McGlade decision set
a new precedent for the authorisation of ILUAs. Prior to the ruling, the
requirements to authorise ILUAs had been based on the 2010 Bygrave
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decision whereby authorisation was considered valid if a clear majority of the
native title claimants voted for the agreement. However, the McGlade case has
nullified these requirements and created uncertainty for 126 ILUAs across the
nation (McKenna, 2017; Mesner, 2017; Sferruzzi, 2017).
McGlade affects native title groups that have a registered claim but have not
received a determination in the Federal Court. This includes the Wangan and
Jagalingou people and their contentious ILUA with Adani (McKenna, 2017).
The McGlade decision requires a unanimous vote to authorise ILUAs. The
Wangan and Jagalingou people who attended the authorisation meeting in
April 2016 voted 294-1. The votes of the native title applicants were also split,
as five of the 12 applicants voted against the ILUA (Mesner, 2017; Robertson,
2017; Rooney, 2017; Sferruzzi, 2017). The vote at the meeting was not
unanimous and the ILUA has become invalidated as a result of McGlade.
In response to McGlade, the Federal Government has sought to amend the NTA
in order to revalidate the affected ILUAs (McKenna, 2017a; Sferruzzi, 2017).
The government has defended the move to amend the Act on the grounds that
McGlade could freeze the operation of some developments and jeopardise the
benefits delivered to Indigenous groups (McHugh, 2017). However,
representatives of the WJ Family Council and a number of Australian Greens
Members and Senators have claimed that the government has ‘fast-tracked’
amendments to remediate the effects on the Carmichael Coal Mine (Borello,
2017; Connors, 2017; “Senate inquiry,” 2017; WJ Family Council, 2017).
As the implications of McGlade presents a further obstacle to the Carmichael
Project, the government has attempted to rush the amendments to secure
certainty for Adani and the coal lobby. It has also been alleged that the motion
to legislate the amendments has proceeded without proper Indigenous
consultation. The Attorney General, George Brandis, has faced criticisms for
his attempt to avoid consultation with stakeholders and pass the amendments
through the Senate in one day (“Miners support,” 2017; “Senate inquiry,”
2017).
The response of the Federal Government in the aftermath of the McGlade
decision can be interpreted through the lens of critical race theory (CRT). A
major concept in CRT is that rights afforded to blacks will always be
diminished when they conflict with white interests. Whites also seek to
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maintain dominance and power over resources. Thus, in the wake of McGlade,
proponents of the amendments to the NTA reflect the view that the rights
afforded to blacks will always be modified or reversed if they are perceived to
undermine the interests of whites. As the Australian Government has a vested
interest in the energy and mining sector, it has prioritised the development of
the Carmichael Coal Mine and ignored Indigenous rights and interests. The
proposed amendments to the Act demonstrate the efforts of government to
negate the requirements of native title and further undermine the rights of
Indigenous opponents to the Carmichael Project.
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Conclusion
The findings of this thesis confirm a number of common observations in the
literature. The decision-making of state institutions and government in
relation to mining development projects commonly bends in favour of mining
interests over Indigenous interests (Howlett, 2010; O’Faircheallaigh, 2006;
Ritter, 2009). The National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT) as a state institution
that deals with developments on areas of native title interprets the Native
Title Act (NTA) to benefit mining interests and rarely rejects proposals
(Howlett, 2010; Corbett & O’Faircheallaigh, 2006; O’Faircheallaigh, 2006).
While the Australian Government has accommodated mining interests, it has
been unwilling to support the interests of native title groups (O’Faircheallaigh,
2006; Ritter, 2009; Scambary, 2013). Several studies concluded that the NTA
offers a weak foothold for Indigenous groups during the approval process. The
NTA cannot be solely relied upon to uphold Indigenous interests and enable
traditional owners to negotiate a desirable agreement with resource
companies or otherwise refuse to accept developments on their land
(O’Faircheallaigh, 2006, 2008; Short, 2007).
In both cases where Adani took the matter to the NNTT for determination, it
ruled in favour of the mining leases and dismissed the applicants’ request for
conditions to be attached to the first mining lease. The conduct of the NNTT
examined in this case study is consistent with the literature, which
demonstrates the State’s reluctance to reject or attach any conditions to
mining developments grants. Adrian Burragubba highlights the resource-focus
of state institutions like the NNTT that corrupt the impartiality of the native
title system. He argues, “There’s an inherent bias in the system where
companies know if they get a “no” they can go to the Tribunal and are virtually
guaranteed to get their mining lease” (Milman, 2015a, para. 10). There is
strong evidence to indicate that Adani remained confident that it had the
unqualified support of the State Government during the phases of approval. In
Patrick Malone’s affidavit to the NNTT, he recalled a conversation with a
representative of Adani:
[who] said words to the effect that the grantee party was ‘flavour of
the week’ with the Government party which wanted the project to go
ahead, and that the grantee party did not need the native title group
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because the grantee party could get all the approvals they need from
the State. (Adani Mining v. Jessie Diver & Others, 2013, p. 51)
This is consistent with the findings in the literature that purport the State will
prioritise mining exploration above Indigenous interests. When matters
proceed to the State for determination, mining companies can rest assured
that they will receive a positive outcome in favour of their interests (Howlett,
2010; O’Faircheallaigh, 2006).
While the literature acknowledges that divided opinion in Indigenous
communities often results during the negotiation process (Altman, 2009;
O’Faircheallaigh, 2006, 2008; Scambary, 2013), there are no studies that
examine community division in depth. This thesis confirms the general view
that the division of communities complicates the process, delays negotiations
and can influence the outcome of agreements. However, this study provides
greater insights into how the process can intensify and perpetuate division.
The emergence of two distinct factions within the Wangan and Jagalingou
claim group reveals the limitations of the native title system in terms of
accommodating the interests of the anti-mine faction. This group has
experienced greater barriers to achieving recognition of their interests. While
Adani has actively attempted to silence the representatives of this cohort by
contesting their authority, the government has failed to provide sufficient
oversight and acknowledge their concerns during parliamentary debate.
These challenges have been compounded by the inadequacies of the rights
afforded to native title claimants under the NTA. The current legislation does
little to support those overtly opposed to developments on their land, as it
lacks the option to veto future acts. These findings highlighting the
weaknesses of the NTA, in terms of providing a platform to assert Indigenous
rights and interests, remain consistent with criticisms in the literature that
expose similar inadequacies (O’Faircheallaigh, 2006, 2008; Short, 2007).
Indigenous land rights in Australia have continued to operate within a system
that prioritises resource interests. This creates an impossible environment for
native title claimants to have their interests recognised and to influence
decision-makers when seeking to prevent the State’s imposition of large
mining developments on their land.
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In addition to the insights on division, this thesis offers a recent case study to
update the existing body of literature. The studies that have previously
examined the convergence of native title, the state and mining developments
have focused on agreements negotiated and signed over 10 years ago (Altman,
2009; Corbett & O’Faircheallaigh, 2006; O’Faircheallaigh, 2006, 2008;
Scambary, 2013). This thesis provides an updated case study, confirming and
adding insights to the existing body of literature.

Added Insights: Multiple Modes of Analysis
While this study confirms the literature in the area of native title and resource
developments, it adds insights through its application of multiple modes of
analysis. The liberal culturalist theories of Will Kymlicka and Allen Buchanan
provide strong justifications for collective rights in liberal democracies.
However, they fail to address the underlying discriminative nature of these
societies that set such ideals on a path to inadequacy. Critical race theory
(CRT) reasons that the failure of collective rights to achieve equality for
Indigenous groups is the embedded racial prejudice that continues to
dominate the status quo in these societies (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012;
Hutchinson, 2004; Gillborn, 2005).
While a liberal culturalist perspective identifies the inherent requirement for
collective rights to remediate inequality, CRT provides an explanation for the
failure of these rights to reach these ideals. CRT exposes the innate racial
imbalance that perseveres in liberal-democratic societies, despite the
adoption of collective rights (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012; Hutchinson, 2004;
Gillborn, 2005). Liberal culturalism conceptualises a set of ideals where the
recognition of collective rights restores a sense of racial equilibrium. CRT
unmasks why these ideals fail to actualize.
Native title represents an idealised system, whereby historical wrongdoings
are rectified through the establishment of collective land rights for Indigenous
groups. While it has conferred benefits to a number of Indigenous groups, it is
also a flawed system. At every stage, the rights allocated under the NTA can be
overridden by the State. CRT argues that while state institutions and
government may support the adoption of collective rights for Indigenous
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people, they ensure that these rights do not supersede the power of white
institutions (Hutchinson, 2004; Delgado & Stefancic, 2012). Australia
represents a significant illustration of CRT theory given the power wielded by
the resource industry, as outlined in Chapter Two. In the Australian context,
economic interests have led to the reversal of the rights afforded to
Indigenous groups. While traditional owners have gained collective rights to
protect their ancestral lands, rights under the NTA do not stand in the way of
the State and government’s power to acquire that land. The Australian
Government has been willing to grant Indigenous rights to land. However, it
has not been willing to sacrifice its power to determine how that land is used.
While the power and influence of energy and mining companies in Australia’s
political sphere are made explicit in this study, its findings reinforce the
doctrine of CRT. State institutions and government have acted to nullify ‘black’
rights and interests in order to advance their own ‘white’ interests, which seek
to expand and invest in the resource sector. While some studies have reasoned
that the limitations of native title are linked to entrenched colonial structures
(Altman, 2009; Short, 2007), this study is the first to examine Indigenous land
rights through the lens of CRT. There remains an embedded bias towards
Indigenous groups that attempt to defend their land when it faces the
encroachment of resource interests. The State’s interpretation of the NTA and
the response of government to the Carmichael Coal Mine illustrate the
deficiencies of a system underpinned by institutionalised racism that
continues to constrain and limit the rights and interests of Indigenous
Australians.

Postscript
As of the time of writing, the final approval for the Carmichael Coal Mine has
been suspended indefinitely due to uncertainty over a royalties deal with the
Queensland Government. The Wangan and Jagalingou Family Council continue
to challenge the development in the courts.
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